Edit

kc3-lang/libbsd/test/explicit_bzero.c

Branch :

  • Browse

    Commit

  • Author : Guillem Jover
    Date : 2022-01-29 14:48:22
    Hash : c9ff8368
    Message : test: Import explicit_bzero and strtonum test cases from OpenBSD - Remove trailing spaces. - Declare file-scope functions and variables static. - Declare functions with a proper prototype. - Do not mix declarations and code for C90 conformance. - Do not compare size_t and ssize_t variables.

  • test/explicit_bzero.c
  • /*	$OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.7 2021/03/27 11:17:58 bcook Exp $	*/
    /*
     * Copyright (c) 2014 Google Inc.
     *
     * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
     * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
     * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
     *
     * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
     * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
     * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
     * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
     * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
     * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
     * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
     */
    
    #include <assert.h>
    #include <errno.h>
    #include <signal.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    
    #define ASSERT_EQ(a, b) assert((a) == (b))
    #define ASSERT_NE(a, b) assert((a) != (b))
    #define ASSERT_GE(a, b) assert((a) >= (b))
    
    /* 128 bits of random data. */
    static const char secret[16] = {
    	0xa0, 0x6c, 0x0c, 0x81, 0xba, 0xd8, 0x5b, 0x0c,
    	0xb0, 0xd6, 0xd4, 0xe3, 0xeb, 0x52, 0x5f, 0x96,
    };
    
    enum {
    	SECRETCOUNT = 64,
    	SECRETBYTES = SECRETCOUNT * sizeof(secret)
    };
    
    /*
     * As of glibc 2.34, when _GNU_SOURCE is defined, SIGSTKSZ is no longer
     * constant on Linux. SIGSTKSZ is redefined to sysconf (_SC_SIGSTKSZ).
     */
    static char *altstack;
    #define ALTSTACK_SIZE (SIGSTKSZ + SECRETBYTES)
    
    static void
    setup_stack(void)
    {
    	const stack_t sigstk = {
    		.ss_sp = altstack = calloc(1, ALTSTACK_SIZE),
    		.ss_size = ALTSTACK_SIZE
    	};
    
    	ASSERT_NE(NULL, altstack);
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaltstack(&sigstk, NULL));
    }
    
    static void
    cleanup_stack(void)
    {
    	free(altstack);
    }
    
    static void
    assert_on_stack(void)
    {
    	stack_t cursigstk;
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaltstack(NULL, &cursigstk));
    	ASSERT_EQ(SS_ONSTACK, cursigstk.ss_flags & (SS_DISABLE|SS_ONSTACK));
    }
    
    static void
    call_on_stack(void (*fn)(int))
    {
    	/*
    	 * This is a bit more complicated than strictly necessary, but
    	 * it ensures we don't have any flaky test failures due to
    	 * inherited signal masks/actions/etc.
    	 *
    	 * On systems where SA_ONSTACK is not supported, this could
    	 * alternatively be implemented using makecontext() or
    	 * pthread_attr_setstack().
    	 */
    
    	const struct sigaction sigact = {
    		.sa_handler = fn,
    		.sa_flags = SA_ONSTACK,
    	};
    	struct sigaction oldsigact;
    	sigset_t sigset, oldsigset;
    
    	/* First, block all signals. */
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigemptyset(&sigset));
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigfillset(&sigset));
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigset, &oldsigset));
    
    	/* Next setup the signal handler for SIGUSR1. */
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sigact, &oldsigact));
    
    	/* Raise SIGUSR1 and momentarily unblock it to run the handler. */
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, raise(SIGUSR1));
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigdelset(&sigset, SIGUSR1));
    	ASSERT_EQ(-1, sigsuspend(&sigset));
    	ASSERT_EQ(EINTR, errno);
    
    	/* Restore the original signal action, stack, and mask. */
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &oldsigact, NULL));
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldsigset, NULL));
    }
    
    static void
    populate_secret(char *buf, ssize_t len)
    {
    	int i, fds[2];
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(fds));
    
    	for (i = 0; i < SECRETCOUNT; i++)
    		ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(secret), write(fds[1], secret, sizeof(secret)));
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fds[1]));
    
    	ASSERT_EQ(len, read(fds[0], buf, len));
    	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fds[0]));
    }
    
    static int
    count_secrets(const char *buf)
    {
    	int res = 0;
    	size_t i;
    	for (i = 0; i < SECRETCOUNT; i++) {
    		if (memcmp(buf + i * sizeof(secret), secret,
    		    sizeof(secret)) == 0)
    			res += 1;
    	}
    	return (res);
    }
    
    static char *
    test_without_bzero(void)
    {
    	char buf[SECRETBYTES];
    	char *res;
    	assert_on_stack();
    	populate_secret(buf, sizeof(buf));
    	res = memmem(altstack, ALTSTACK_SIZE, buf, sizeof(buf));
    	ASSERT_NE(NULL, res);
    	return (res);
    }
    
    static char *
    test_with_bzero(void)
    {
    	char buf[SECRETBYTES];
    	char *res;
    	assert_on_stack();
    	populate_secret(buf, sizeof(buf));
    	res = memmem(altstack, ALTSTACK_SIZE, buf, sizeof(buf));
    	ASSERT_NE(NULL, res);
    	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
    	return (res);
    }
    
    static void
    do_test_without_bzero(int signo)
    {
    	char *buf = test_without_bzero();
    	ASSERT_GE(count_secrets(buf), 1);
    }
    
    static void
    do_test_with_bzero(int signo)
    {
    	char *buf = test_with_bzero();
    	ASSERT_EQ(count_secrets(buf), 0);
    }
    
    int
    main(int argc, char **argv)
    {
    	setup_stack();
    
    	/*
    	 * Solaris and OS X clobber the signal stack after returning to the
    	 * normal stack, so we need to inspect altstack while we're still
    	 * running on it.  Unfortunately, this means we risk clobbering the
    	 * buffer ourselves.
    	 *
    	 * To minimize this risk, test_with{,out}_bzero() are responsible for
    	 * locating the offset of their buf variable within altstack, and
    	 * and returning that address.  Then we can simply memcmp() repeatedly
    	 * to count how many instances of secret we found.
    	 */
    
    	/*
    	 * First, test that if we *don't* call explicit_bzero, that we
    	 * *are* able to find at least one instance of the secret data still
    	 * on the stack.  This sanity checks that call_on_stack() and
    	 * populate_secret() work as intended.
    	 */
    	memset(altstack, 0, ALTSTACK_SIZE);
    	call_on_stack(do_test_without_bzero);
    
    	/*
    	 * Now test with a call to explicit_bzero() and check that we
    	 * *don't* find any instances of the secret data.
    	 */
    	memset(altstack, 0, ALTSTACK_SIZE);
    	call_on_stack(do_test_with_bzero);
    
    	cleanup_stack();
    
    	return (0);
    }