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kc3-lang/libevent/arc4random.c

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  • Author : Nick Mathewson
    Date : 2012-02-29 15:07:31
    Hash : 68120d9b
    Message : Convert event-config.h macros to avoid reserved identifiers C reserves all identifiers beginning with an underscore for system use. But we had been mangling our autoconf identifiers with the prefix "_EVENT_" to avoid conflict with other programs. Instead, we will now use the prefix "EVENT__". With any luck, the double-underscore will still hint "here be dragons" to anybody tempted to think that event-config.h is a stable api. This is an automatically generated patch. The script that produced it was made by running this script over config.h.in: ===== #!/usr/bin/perl -w # Run this on config.h.in use strict; my %macros = (); while (<>) { if (/^# *undef +([A-Za-z0-9_]+)/) { $macros{$1} = 1; } } print "#!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p\n\n"; for my $k (sort keys %macros) { print "s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_$k(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__$k/g;\n"; } == And the script that it generated was then run over all .c and .h files: #!/usr/bin/perl -w -i -p s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_DISABLE_DEBUG_MODE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__DISABLE_DEBUG_MODE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_DISABLE_MM_REPLACEMENT(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__DISABLE_MM_REPLACEMENT/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_DISABLE_THREAD_SUPPORT(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__DISABLE_THREAD_SUPPORT/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_ACCEPT4(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_ACCEPT4/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_ARC4RANDOM(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_ARC4RANDOM/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_ARPA_INET_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_ARPA_INET_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_DECL_KERN_ARND(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_ARND/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_DECL_KERN_RANDOM(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_RANDOM/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_DECL_RANDOM_UUID(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_DECL_RANDOM_UUID/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_DEVPOLL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_DEVPOLL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_DLFCN_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_DLFCN_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_EPOLL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_EPOLL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_EPOLL_CREATE1(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_EPOLL_CREATE1/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_EPOLL_CTL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_EPOLL_CTL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_EVENTFD(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_EVENTFD/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_EVENT_PORTS(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_EVENT_PORTS/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_FCNTL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_FCNTL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_FCNTL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_FCNTL_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_FD_MASK(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_FD_MASK/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETADDRINFO(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETADDRINFO/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETEGID(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETEGID/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETEUID(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETEUID/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R_3_ARG(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R_3_ARG/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R_5_ARG(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R_5_ARG/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R_6_ARG(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R_6_ARG/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETIFADDRS(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETIFADDRS/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETNAMEINFO(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETNAMEINFO/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETPROTOBYNUMBER(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETPROTOBYNUMBER/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETSERVBYNAME(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETSERVBYNAME/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_IFADDRS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_IFADDRS_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_INET_ATON(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_INET_ATON/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_INET_NTOP(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_INET_NTOP/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_INET_PTON(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_INET_PTON/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_INTTYPES_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_INTTYPES_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_ISSETUGID(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_ISSETUGID/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_KQUEUE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_KQUEUE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_LIBZ(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_LIBZ/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_MEMORY_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_MEMORY_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_MMAP(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_MMAP/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_NANOSLEEP(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_NANOSLEEP/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_NETDB_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_NETDB_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_NETINET_IN6_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_NETINET_IN_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_NETINET_IN_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_OPENSSL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_OPENSSL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_PIPE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_PIPE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_PIPE2(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_PIPE2/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_POLL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_POLL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_POLL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_POLL_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_PORT_CREATE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_PORT_CREATE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_PORT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_PORT_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_PTHREAD(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_PTHREAD/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_PTHREADS(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_PTHREADS/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_PUTENV(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_PUTENV/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SELECT(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SELECT/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SENDFILE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SENDFILE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SETENV(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SETENV/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SETFD(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SETFD/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SETRLIMIT(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SETRLIMIT/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SIGACTION(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SIGACTION/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SIGNAL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SIGNAL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SPLICE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SPLICE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STDARG_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STDARG_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STDDEF_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STDDEF_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STDINT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STDINT_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STDLIB_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STDLIB_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRINGS_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRINGS_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRING_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRING_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRLCPY(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRLCPY/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRSEP(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRSEP/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRTOK_R(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRTOK_R/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRTOLL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRTOLL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR_S6_ADDR16(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR_S6_ADDR16/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR_S6_ADDR32(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR_S6_ADDR32/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_LEN(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_LEN/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN_SIN_LEN(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN_SIN_LEN/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE_SS_FAMILY(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE_SS_FAMILY/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE___SS_FAMILY(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE___SS_FAMILY/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYSCTL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYSCTL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_DEVPOLL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_DEVPOLL_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_EPOLL_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_EVENTFD_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_EVENTFD_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_EVENT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_EVENT_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_QUEUE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_QUEUE_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_SENDFILE_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SENDFILE_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_STAT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_STAT_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_TIME_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_TIME_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_UIO_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_UIO_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_TAILQFOREACH(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_TAILQFOREACH/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_TIMERADD(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_TIMERADD/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_TIMERCLEAR(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_TIMERCLEAR/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_TIMERCMP(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_TIMERCMP/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_TIMERISSET(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_TIMERISSET/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_UINT16_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_UINT16_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_UINT32_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_UINT32_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_UINT64_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_UINT64_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_UINT8_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_UINT8_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_UINTPTR_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_UINTPTR_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_UNISTD_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_UNISTD_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_UNSETENV(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_UNSETENV/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_USLEEP(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_USLEEP/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_VASPRINTF(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_VASPRINTF/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_WORKING_KQUEUE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_WORKING_KQUEUE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_HAVE_ZLIB_H(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__HAVE_ZLIB_H/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_LT_OBJDIR(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__LT_OBJDIR/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_NO_MINUS_C_MINUS_O(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__NO_MINUS_C_MINUS_O/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_NUMERIC_VERSION(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__NUMERIC_VERSION/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_PACKAGE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__PACKAGE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_PACKAGE_BUGREPORT(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__PACKAGE_BUGREPORT/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_PACKAGE_NAME(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__PACKAGE_NAME/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_PACKAGE_STRING(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__PACKAGE_STRING/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_PACKAGE_TARNAME(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__PACKAGE_TARNAME/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_PACKAGE_URL(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__PACKAGE_URL/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_PACKAGE_VERSION(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__PACKAGE_VERSION/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__PTHREAD_CREATE_JOINABLE/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_SIZEOF_INT(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__SIZEOF_INT/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_SIZEOF_LONG(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__SIZEOF_LONG/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_SIZEOF_LONG_LONG(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__SIZEOF_LONG_LONG/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_SIZEOF_OFF_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__SIZEOF_OFF_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_SIZEOF_PTHREAD_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__SIZEOF_PTHREAD_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_SIZEOF_SHORT(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__SIZEOF_SHORT/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_SIZEOF_SIZE_T(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__SIZEOF_SIZE_T/g; s/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])_EVENT_SIZEOF_VOID_P(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/EVENT__SIZEOF_VOID_P/g; 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  • arc4random.c
  • /* Portable arc4random.c based on arc4random.c from OpenBSD.
     * Portable version by Chris Davis, adapted for Libevent by Nick Mathewson
     * Copyright (c) 2010 Chris Davis, Niels Provos, and Nick Mathewson
     * Copyright (c) 2010-2012 Niels Provos and Nick Mathewson
     *
     * Note that in Libevent, this file isn't compiled directly.  Instead,
     * it's included from evutil_rand.c
     */
    
    /*
     * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
     * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
     *
     * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
     * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
     * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
     *
     * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
     * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
     * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
     * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
     * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
     * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
     * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
     */
    
    /*
     * Arc4 random number generator for OpenBSD.
     *
     * This code is derived from section 17.1 of Applied Cryptography,
     * second edition, which describes a stream cipher allegedly
     * compatible with RSA Labs "RC4" cipher (the actual description of
     * which is a trade secret).  The same algorithm is used as a stream
     * cipher called "arcfour" in Tatu Ylonen's ssh package.
     *
     * Here the stream cipher has been modified always to include the time
     * when initializing the state.  That makes it impossible to
     * regenerate the same random sequence twice, so this can't be used
     * for encryption, but will generate good random numbers.
     *
     * RC4 is a registered trademark of RSA Laboratories.
     */
    
    #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT
    #define ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT
    #endif
    
    #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_UINT32
    #define ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 uint32_t
    #endif
    
    #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NO_INCLUDES
    #include "evconfig-private.h"
    #ifdef _WIN32
    #include <wincrypt.h>
    #include <process.h>
    #else
    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/param.h>
    #include <sys/time.h>
    #ifdef EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
    #include <sys/sysctl.h>
    #endif
    #endif
    #include <limits.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #endif
    
    /* Add platform entropy 32 bytes (256 bits) at a time. */
    #define ADD_ENTROPY 32
    
    /* Re-seed from the platform RNG after generating this many bytes. */
    #define BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED 1600000
    
    struct arc4_stream {
    	unsigned char i;
    	unsigned char j;
    	unsigned char s[256];
    };
    
    #ifdef _WIN32
    #define getpid _getpid
    #define pid_t int
    #endif
    
    static int rs_initialized;
    static struct arc4_stream rs;
    static pid_t arc4_stir_pid;
    static int arc4_count;
    static int arc4_seeded_ok;
    
    static inline unsigned char arc4_getbyte(void);
    
    static inline void
    arc4_init(void)
    {
    	int     n;
    
    	for (n = 0; n < 256; n++)
    		rs.s[n] = n;
    	rs.i = 0;
    	rs.j = 0;
    }
    
    static inline void
    arc4_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen)
    {
    	int     n;
    	unsigned char si;
    
    	rs.i--;
    	for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) {
    		rs.i = (rs.i + 1);
    		si = rs.s[rs.i];
    		rs.j = (rs.j + si + dat[n % datlen]);
    		rs.s[rs.i] = rs.s[rs.j];
    		rs.s[rs.j] = si;
    	}
    	rs.j = rs.i;
    }
    
    #ifndef _WIN32
    static ssize_t
    read_all(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t count)
    {
    	size_t numread = 0;
    	ssize_t result;
    
    	while (numread < count) {
    		result = read(fd, buf+numread, count-numread);
    		if (result<0)
    			return -1;
    		else if (result == 0)
    			break;
    		numread += result;
    	}
    
    	return (ssize_t)numread;
    }
    #endif
    
    #ifdef _WIN32
    #define TRY_SEED_WIN32
    static int
    arc4_seed_win32(void)
    {
    	/* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */
    	static int provider_set = 0;
    	static HCRYPTPROV provider;
    	unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
    
    	if (!provider_set) {
    		if (!CryptAcquireContext(&provider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
    		    CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
    			if (GetLastError() != (DWORD)NTE_BAD_KEYSET)
    				return -1;
    		}
    		provider_set = 1;
    	}
    	if (!CryptGenRandom(provider, sizeof(buf), buf))
    		return -1;
    	arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
    	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    	arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
    	return 0;
    }
    #endif
    
    #if defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H) && defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYSCTL)
    #if EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_RANDOM && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_RANDOM_UUID
    #define TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_LINUX
    static int
    arc4_seed_sysctl_linux(void)
    {
    	/* Based on code by William Ahern, this function tries to use the
    	 * RANDOM_UUID sysctl to get entropy from the kernel.  This can work
    	 * even if /dev/urandom is inaccessible for some reason (e.g., we're
    	 * running in a chroot). */
    	int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_RANDOM, RANDOM_UUID };
    	unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
    	size_t len, n;
    	unsigned i;
    	int any_set;
    
    	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    
    	for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf); len += n) {
    		n = sizeof(buf) - len;
    
    		if (0 != sysctl(mib, 3, &buf[len], &n, NULL, 0))
    			return -1;
    	}
    	/* make sure that the buffer actually got set. */
    	for (i=0,any_set=0; i<sizeof(buf); ++i) {
    		any_set |= buf[i];
    	}
    	if (!any_set)
    		return -1;
    
    	arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
    	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    	arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
    	return 0;
    }
    #endif
    
    #if EVENT__HAVE_DECL_CTL_KERN && EVENT__HAVE_DECL_KERN_ARND
    #define TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_BSD
    static int
    arc4_seed_sysctl_bsd(void)
    {
    	/* Based on code from William Ahern and from OpenBSD, this function
    	 * tries to use the KERN_ARND syscall to get entropy from the kernel.
    	 * This can work even if /dev/urandom is inaccessible for some reason
    	 * (e.g., we're running in a chroot). */
    	int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND };
    	unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
    	size_t len, n;
    	int i, any_set;
    
    	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    
    	len = sizeof(buf);
    	if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) {
    		for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf); len += sizeof(unsigned)) {
    			n = sizeof(unsigned);
    			if (n + len > sizeof(buf))
    			    n = len - sizeof(buf);
    			if (sysctl(mib, 2, &buf[len], &n, NULL, 0) == -1)
    				return -1;
    		}
    	}
    	/* make sure that the buffer actually got set. */
    	for (i=any_set=0; i<sizeof(buf); ++i) {
    		any_set |= buf[i];
    	}
    	if (!any_set)
    		return -1;
    
    	arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
    	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    	arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
    	return 0;
    }
    #endif
    #endif /* defined(EVENT__HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H) */
    
    #ifdef __linux__
    #define TRY_SEED_PROC_SYS_KERNEL_RANDOM_UUID
    static int
    arc4_seed_proc_sys_kernel_random_uuid(void)
    {
    	/* Occasionally, somebody will make /proc/sys accessible in a chroot,
    	 * but not /dev/urandom.  Let's try /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid.
    	 * Its format is stupid, so we need to decode it from hex.
    	 */
    	int fd;
    	char buf[128];
    	unsigned char entropy[64];
    	int bytes, n, i, nybbles;
    	for (bytes = 0; bytes<ADD_ENTROPY; ) {
    		fd = evutil_open_closeonexec("/proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid", O_RDONLY, 0);
    		if (fd < 0)
    			return -1;
    		n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
    		close(fd);
    		if (n<=0)
    			return -1;
    		memset(entropy, 0, sizeof(entropy));
    		for (i=nybbles=0; i<n; ++i) {
    			if (EVUTIL_ISXDIGIT(buf[i])) {
    				int nyb = evutil_hex_char_to_int(buf[i]);
    				if (nybbles & 1) {
    					entropy[nybbles/2] |= nyb;
    				} else {
    					entropy[nybbles/2] |= nyb<<4;
    				}
    				++nybbles;
    			}
    		}
    		if (nybbles < 2)
    			return -1;
    		arc4_addrandom(entropy, nybbles/2);
    		bytes += nybbles/2;
    	}
    	memset(entropy, 0, sizeof(entropy));
    	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    	return 0;
    }
    #endif
    
    #ifndef _WIN32
    #define TRY_SEED_URANDOM
    static int
    arc4_seed_urandom(void)
    {
    	/* This is adapted from Tor's crypto_seed_rng() */
    	static const char *filenames[] = {
    		"/dev/srandom", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", NULL
    	};
    	unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
    	int fd, i;
    	size_t n;
    
    	for (i = 0; filenames[i]; ++i) {
    		fd = evutil_open_closeonexec(filenames[i], O_RDONLY, 0);
    		if (fd<0)
    			continue;
    		n = read_all(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
    		close(fd);
    		if (n != sizeof(buf))
    			return -1;
    		arc4_addrandom(buf, sizeof(buf));
    		memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    		arc4_seeded_ok = 1;
    		return 0;
    	}
    
    	return -1;
    }
    #endif
    
    static int
    arc4_seed(void)
    {
    	int ok = 0;
    	/* We try every method that might work, and don't give up even if one
    	 * does seem to work.  There's no real harm in over-seeding, and if
    	 * one of these sources turns out to be broken, that would be bad. */
    #ifdef TRY_SEED_WIN32
    	if (0 == arc4_seed_win32())
    		ok = 1;
    #endif
    #ifdef TRY_SEED_URANDOM
    	if (0 == arc4_seed_urandom())
    		ok = 1;
    #endif
    #ifdef TRY_SEED_PROC_SYS_KERNEL_RANDOM_UUID
    	if (0 == arc4_seed_proc_sys_kernel_random_uuid())
    		ok = 1;
    #endif
    #ifdef TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_LINUX
    	/* Apparently Linux is deprecating sysctl, and spewing warning
    	 * messages when you try to use it. */
    	if (!ok && 0 == arc4_seed_sysctl_linux())
    		ok = 1;
    #endif
    #ifdef TRY_SEED_SYSCTL_BSD
    	if (0 == arc4_seed_sysctl_bsd())
    		ok = 1;
    #endif
    	return ok ? 0 : -1;
    }
    
    static int
    arc4_stir(void)
    {
    	int     i;
    
    	if (!rs_initialized) {
    		arc4_init();
    		rs_initialized = 1;
    	}
    
    	arc4_seed();
    	if (!arc4_seeded_ok)
    		return -1;
    
    	/*
    	 * Discard early keystream, as per recommendations in
    	 * "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4" by
    	 * Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir.
    	 * http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/Rc4_ksa.ps
    	 *
    	 * Ilya Mironov's "(Not So) Random Shuffles of RC4" suggests that
    	 * we drop at least 2*256 bytes, with 12*256 as a conservative
    	 * value.
    	 *
    	 * RFC4345 says to drop 6*256.
    	 *
    	 * At least some versions of this code drop 4*256, in a mistaken
    	 * belief that "words" in the Fluhrer/Mantin/Shamir paper refers
    	 * to processor words.
    	 *
    	 * We add another sect to the cargo cult, and choose 12*256.
    	 */
    	for (i = 0; i < 12*256; i++)
    		(void)arc4_getbyte();
    	arc4_count = BYTES_BEFORE_RESEED;
    
    	return 0;
    }
    
    
    static void
    arc4_stir_if_needed(void)
    {
    	pid_t pid = getpid();
    
    	if (arc4_count <= 0 || !rs_initialized || arc4_stir_pid != pid)
    	{
    		arc4_stir_pid = pid;
    		arc4_stir();
    	}
    }
    
    static inline unsigned char
    arc4_getbyte(void)
    {
    	unsigned char si, sj;
    
    	rs.i = (rs.i + 1);
    	si = rs.s[rs.i];
    	rs.j = (rs.j + si);
    	sj = rs.s[rs.j];
    	rs.s[rs.i] = sj;
    	rs.s[rs.j] = si;
    	return (rs.s[(si + sj) & 0xff]);
    }
    
    static inline unsigned int
    arc4_getword(void)
    {
    	unsigned int val;
    
    	val = arc4_getbyte() << 24;
    	val |= arc4_getbyte() << 16;
    	val |= arc4_getbyte() << 8;
    	val |= arc4_getbyte();
    
    	return val;
    }
    
    #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOSTIR
    ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT int
    arc4random_stir(void)
    {
    	int val;
    	_ARC4_LOCK();
    	val = arc4_stir();
    	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
    	return val;
    }
    #endif
    
    #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOADDRANDOM
    ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void
    arc4random_addrandom(const unsigned char *dat, int datlen)
    {
    	int j;
    	_ARC4_LOCK();
    	if (!rs_initialized)
    		arc4_stir();
    	for (j = 0; j < datlen; j += 256) {
    		/* arc4_addrandom() ignores all but the first 256 bytes of
    		 * its input.  We want to make sure to look at ALL the
    		 * data in 'dat', just in case the user is doing something
    		 * crazy like passing us all the files in /var/log. */
    		arc4_addrandom(dat + j, datlen - j);
    	}
    	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
    }
    #endif
    
    #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NORANDOM
    ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT ARC4RANDOM_UINT32
    arc4random(void)
    {
    	ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 val;
    	_ARC4_LOCK();
    	arc4_count -= 4;
    	arc4_stir_if_needed();
    	val = arc4_getword();
    	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
    	return val;
    }
    #endif
    
    ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT void
    arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
    {
    	unsigned char *buf = _buf;
    	_ARC4_LOCK();
    	arc4_stir_if_needed();
    	while (n--) {
    		if (--arc4_count <= 0)
    			arc4_stir();
    		buf[n] = arc4_getbyte();
    	}
    	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
    }
    
    #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_NOUNIFORM
    /*
     * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
     * avoiding "modulo bias".
     *
     * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
     * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound).  This
     * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
     * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
     * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
     */
    ARC4RANDOM_EXPORT unsigned int
    arc4random_uniform(unsigned int upper_bound)
    {
    	ARC4RANDOM_UINT32 r, min;
    
    	if (upper_bound < 2)
    		return 0;
    
    #if (UINT_MAX > 0xffffffffUL)
    	min = 0x100000000UL % upper_bound;
    #else
    	/* Calculate (2**32 % upper_bound) avoiding 64-bit math */
    	if (upper_bound > 0x80000000)
    		min = 1 + ~upper_bound;		/* 2**32 - upper_bound */
    	else {
    		/* (2**32 - (x * 2)) % x == 2**32 % x when x <= 2**31 */
    		min = ((0xffffffff - (upper_bound * 2)) + 1) % upper_bound;
    	}
    #endif
    
    	/*
    	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
    	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
    	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
    	 * to re-roll.
    	 */
    	for (;;) {
    		r = arc4random();
    		if (r >= min)
    			break;
    	}
    
    	return r % upper_bound;
    }
    #endif