kc3-lang/libressl

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Log

Commit	Date	Message
2dc0a6ac	2014-12-30 15:13:19	Merge recent upstream changes with compiler hardening Conflicts: configure.ac
9adc6d64	2014-12-27 16:52:25	Revert "do not double-link libcrypto" This reverts commit c83d468cfd5d3ca60a499b69c0b7c9d0b159d405. It wasn't as superfluous as I thought on all platforms.
c83d468c	2014-12-27 16:34:48	do not double-link libcrypto libssl already has LIBFLAGS for libcrypto, so adding -lcrypto is superfluous.
23c90228	2014-12-27 16:34:02	enable __STRICT_ALIGNMENT on sparc
c0a8ddc1	2014-12-23 21:47:03	configure.ac: use executable hardening where available Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". The code added to m4/ is GPLv3 but con Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
a6c07234	2014-12-23 05:24:24	configure.ac: use executable hardening where available Where available, enable stack smashing protection, fortify source, no-strict-overflow, and read only relocations. Many Linux distributions automatically enable most of these options. They are no brainers. The difference introduced here is in asking for a few more aggressive options. An option to disable the more aggressive options is provided (--disable-hardening). When set, configure will fall back to the default CFLAGS on the system - in many cases that will still be hardened. There is no point in going further than that. Options enabled are: -fstack-protector-strong is a relatively new GCC-4.9 feature that is supposed to give a better balance between performance and protection. -all is considered too aggressive, but was used in Chromium and other security critical systems until -strong became available. Follow their lead and use -strong when possible. clang 6.0 supports -all but not -strong. _FORTIFY_SOURCE replaces certain unsafe C str* and mem* functions with more robust equivalents when the compiler can determine the length of the buffers involved. -fno-strict-overflow instructs GCC to not make optimizations based on the assumption that signed arithmetic will wrap around on overflow (e.g. (short)0x7FFF + 1 == 0). This prevents the optimizer from doing some unexpected things. Further improvements should trap signed overflows and reduce the use of signed to refer to naturally unsigned quantities. I did not set -fPIE (position independent executables). The critical function of Open/LibreSSL is as a library, not an executable. Tested on Ubuntu Linux 14.04.1 LTS, OS X 10.10.1 with "make check". Signed-off-by: Jim Barlow <jim@purplerock.ca>
164f684e	2014-12-23 04:38:43	configure.ac: Modify clang check to save result to a variable ...and leave a note that -Qunused-arguments is being applied to CFLAGS not LDFLAGS, probably in error.
04158cd4	2014-12-21 23:14:02	do not mark GNU_STACK WX in ELFs generated from assembly When generating ELF objects from assembly, gcc and clang mark the GNU_STACK program headers as RWX by default. This is a security issue, so we make sure it is marked only RW. This modifies Anthony G. Basile's original patch for Linux to set .note.GNU-stack whenever the assembler supports it. It is surprising that any modern toolchain would enable an executable stack without an explicit request. The number of programs that need an executable stack is surely much smaller than the number of programs that include assembly.
8c6c07c5	2014-12-15 07:43:17	Add wrapper file "config" to distribution.
56f75233	2014-12-14 21:03:17	enable OS X and Linux CI builds