Commit 64c612cc3e25eff5fb02c59ef5a66ba7a14751e4
2019-09-18T15:25:02
Protect against 8.3 "short name" attacks also on Linux/macOS The Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) is getting increasingly popular, in particular because it makes it _so_ easy to run Linux software on Windows' files, via the auto-mounted Windows drives (`C:\` is mapped to `/mnt/c/`, no need to set that up manually). Unfortunately, files/directories on the Windows drives can be accessed via their _short names_, if that feature is enabled (which it is on the `C:` drive by default). Which means that we have to safeguard even our Linux users against the short name attacks. Further, while the default options of CIFS/SMB-mounts seem to disallow accessing files on network shares via their short names on Linux/macOS, it _is_ possible to do so with the right options. So let's just safe-guard against short name attacks _everywhere_. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
diff --git a/src/checkout.c b/src/checkout.c
index 5cfa728..5b20ede 100644
--- a/src/checkout.c
+++ b/src/checkout.c
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ static int checkout_verify_paths(
int action,
git_diff_delta *delta)
{
- unsigned int flags = GIT_PATH_REJECT_WORKDIR_DEFAULTS;
+ unsigned int flags = GIT_PATH_REJECT_WORKDIR_DEFAULTS | GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS;
if (action & CHECKOUT_ACTION__REMOVE) {
if (!git_path_isvalid(repo, delta->old_file.path, delta->old_file.mode, flags)) {
diff --git a/tests/checkout/nasty.c b/tests/checkout/nasty.c
index 3897878..a0ac738 100644
--- a/tests/checkout/nasty.c
+++ b/tests/checkout/nasty.c
@@ -206,9 +206,8 @@ void test_checkout_nasty__dot_git_dot(void)
*/
void test_checkout_nasty__git_tilde1(void)
{
-#ifdef GIT_WIN32
test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/git_tilde1", ".git/foobar");
-#endif
+ test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/git_tilde1", "git~1/foobar");
}
/* A tree that contains an entry "git~2", when we have forced the short