Merge pull request #5331 from pks-t/security-fixes Security fixes for master
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diff --git a/docs/changelog.md b/docs/changelog.md
index 1ca7049..f52af86 100644
--- a/docs/changelog.md
+++ b/docs/changelog.md
@@ -1,6 +1,63 @@
v0.28 + 1
---------
+# Security Fixes
+
+- CVE-2019-1348: the fast-import stream command "feature
+ export-marks=path" allows writing to arbitrary file paths. As
+ libgit2 does not offer any interface for fast-import, it is not
+ susceptible to this vulnerability.
+
+- CVE-2019-1349: by using NTFS 8.3 short names, backslashes or
+ alternate filesystreams, it is possible to cause submodules to
+ be written into pre-existing directories during a recursive
+ clone using git. As libgit2 rejects cloning into non-empty
+ directories by default, it is not susceptible to this
+ vulnerability.
+
+- CVE-2019-1350: recursive clones may lead to arbitrary remote
+ code executing due to improper quoting of command line
+ arguments. As libgit2 uses libssh2, which does not require us
+ to perform command line parsing, it is not susceptible to this
+ vulnerability.
+
+- CVE-2019-1351: Windows provides the ability to substitute
+ drive letters with arbitrary letters, including multi-byte
+ Unicode letters. To fix any potential issues arising from
+ interpreting such paths as relative paths, we have extended
+ detection of DOS drive prefixes to accomodate for such cases.
+
+- CVE-2019-1352: by using NTFS-style alternative file streams for
+ the ".git" directory, it is possible to overwrite parts of the
+ repository. While this has been fixed in the past for Windows,
+ the same vulnerability may also exist on other systems that
+ write to NTFS filesystems. We now reject any paths starting
+ with ".git:" on all systems.
+
+- CVE-2019-1353: by using NTFS-style 8.3 short names, it was
+ possible to write to the ".git" directory and thus overwrite
+ parts of the repository, leading to possible remote code
+ execution. While this problem was already fixed in the past for
+ Windows, other systems accessing NTFS filesystems are
+ vulnerable to this issue too. We now enable NTFS protecions by
+ default on all systems to fix this attack vector.
+
+- CVE-2019-1354: on Windows, backslashes are not a valid part of
+ a filename but are instead interpreted as directory separators.
+ As other platforms allowed to use such paths, it was possible
+ to write such invalid entries into a Git repository and was
+ thus an attack vector to write into the ".git" dierctory. We
+ now reject any entries starting with ".git\" on all systems.
+
+- CVE-2019-1387: it is possible to let a submodule's git
+ directory point into a sibling's submodule directory, which may
+ result in overwriting parts of the Git repository and thus lead
+ to arbitrary command execution. As libgit2 doesn't provide any
+ way to do submodule clones natively, it is not susceptible to
+ this vulnerability. Users of libgit2 that have implemented
+ recursive submodule clones manually are encouraged to review
+ their implementation for this vulnerability.
+
### Breaking API changes
* The "private" implementation details of the `git_cred` structure have been
diff --git a/src/path.c b/src/path.c
index 732834f..625b95c 100644
--- a/src/path.c
+++ b/src/path.c
@@ -21,7 +21,29 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
-#define LOOKS_LIKE_DRIVE_PREFIX(S) (git__isalpha((S)[0]) && (S)[1] == ':')
+static int dos_drive_prefix_length(const char *path)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Does it start with an ASCII letter (i.e. highest bit not set),
+ * followed by a colon?
+ */
+ if (!(0x80 & (unsigned char)*path))
+ return *path && path[1] == ':' ? 2 : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * While drive letters must be letters of the English alphabet, it is
+ * possible to assign virtually _any_ Unicode character via `subst` as
+ * a drive letter to "virtual drives". Even `1`, or `รค`. Or fun stuff
+ * like this:
+ *
+ * subst ึ: %USERPROFILE%\Desktop
+ */
+ for (i = 1; i < 4 && (0x80 & (unsigned char)path[i]); i++)
+ ; /* skip first UTF-8 character */
+ return path[i] == ':' ? i + 1 : 0;
+}
#ifdef GIT_WIN32
static bool looks_like_network_computer_name(const char *path, int pos)
@@ -123,11 +145,11 @@ static int win32_prefix_length(const char *path, int len)
GIT_UNUSED(len);
#else
/*
- * Mimic unix behavior where '/.git' returns '/': 'C:/.git' will return
- * 'C:/' here
+ * Mimic unix behavior where '/.git' returns '/': 'C:/.git'
+ * will return 'C:/' here
*/
- if (len == 2 && LOOKS_LIKE_DRIVE_PREFIX(path))
- return 2;
+ if (dos_drive_prefix_length(path) == len)
+ return len;
/*
* Similarly checks if we're dealing with a network computer name
@@ -272,11 +294,11 @@ const char *git_path_topdir(const char *path)
int git_path_root(const char *path)
{
- int offset = 0;
+ int offset = 0, prefix_len;
/* Does the root of the path look like a windows drive ? */
- if (LOOKS_LIKE_DRIVE_PREFIX(path))
- offset += 2;
+ if ((prefix_len = dos_drive_prefix_length(path)))
+ offset += prefix_len;
#ifdef GIT_WIN32
/* Are we dealing with a windows network path? */
@@ -1624,8 +1646,12 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_dotgit_ntfs(git_repository *repo, const char *path, size
if (!start)
return true;
- /* Reject paths like ".git\" */
- if (path[start] == '\\')
+ /*
+ * Reject paths that start with Windows-style directory separators
+ * (".git\") or NTFS alternate streams (".git:") and could be used
+ * to write to the ".git" directory on Windows platforms.
+ */
+ if (path[start] == '\\' || path[start] == ':')
return false;
/* Reject paths like '.git ' or '.git.' */
@@ -1637,12 +1663,21 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_dotgit_ntfs(git_repository *repo, const char *path, size
return false;
}
-GIT_INLINE(bool) only_spaces_and_dots(const char *path)
+/*
+ * Windows paths that end with spaces and/or dots are elided to the
+ * path without them for backward compatibility. That is to say
+ * that opening file "foo ", "foo." or even "foo . . ." will all
+ * map to a filename of "foo". This function identifies spaces and
+ * dots at the end of a filename, whether the proper end of the
+ * filename (end of string) or a colon (which would indicate a
+ * Windows alternate data stream.)
+ */
+GIT_INLINE(bool) ntfs_end_of_filename(const char *path)
{
const char *c = path;
for (;; c++) {
- if (*c == '\0')
+ if (*c == '\0' || *c == ':')
return true;
if (*c != ' ' && *c != '.')
return false;
@@ -1657,13 +1692,13 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_dotgit_ntfs_generic(const char *name, size_t len, const
if (name[0] == '.' && len >= dotgit_len &&
!strncasecmp(name + 1, dotgit_name, dotgit_len)) {
- return !only_spaces_and_dots(name + dotgit_len + 1);
+ return !ntfs_end_of_filename(name + dotgit_len + 1);
}
/* Detect the basic NTFS shortname with the first six chars */
if (!strncasecmp(name, dotgit_name, 6) && name[6] == '~' &&
name[7] >= '1' && name[7] <= '4')
- return !only_spaces_and_dots(name + 8);
+ return !ntfs_end_of_filename(name + 8);
/* Catch fallback names */
for (i = 0, saw_tilde = 0; i < 8; i++) {
@@ -1685,7 +1720,7 @@ GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_dotgit_ntfs_generic(const char *name, size_t len, const
}
}
- return !only_spaces_and_dots(name + i);
+ return !ntfs_end_of_filename(name + i);
}
GIT_INLINE(bool) verify_char(unsigned char c, unsigned int flags)
@@ -1819,7 +1854,7 @@ GIT_INLINE(unsigned int) dotgit_flags(
git_repository *repo,
unsigned int flags)
{
- int protectHFS = 0, protectNTFS = 0;
+ int protectHFS = 0, protectNTFS = 1;
int error = 0;
flags |= GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_LITERAL;
@@ -1828,16 +1863,12 @@ GIT_INLINE(unsigned int) dotgit_flags(
protectHFS = 1;
#endif
-#ifdef GIT_WIN32
- protectNTFS = 1;
-#endif
-
if (repo && !protectHFS)
error = git_repository__configmap_lookup(&protectHFS, repo, GIT_CONFIGMAP_PROTECTHFS);
if (!error && protectHFS)
flags |= GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_HFS;
- if (repo && !protectNTFS)
+ if (repo)
error = git_repository__configmap_lookup(&protectNTFS, repo, GIT_CONFIGMAP_PROTECTNTFS);
if (!error && protectNTFS)
flags |= GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS;
diff --git a/src/repository.h b/src/repository.h
index 1e02bcc..bafdb58 100644
--- a/src/repository.h
+++ b/src/repository.h
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ typedef enum {
/* core.protectHFS */
GIT_PROTECTHFS_DEFAULT = GIT_CONFIGMAP_FALSE,
/* core.protectNTFS */
- GIT_PROTECTNTFS_DEFAULT = GIT_CONFIGMAP_FALSE,
+ GIT_PROTECTNTFS_DEFAULT = GIT_CONFIGMAP_TRUE,
/* core.fsyncObjectFiles */
GIT_FSYNCOBJECTFILES_DEFAULT = GIT_CONFIGMAP_FALSE,
} git_configmap_value;
diff --git a/tests/checkout/nasty.c b/tests/checkout/nasty.c
index 3897878..611e850 100644
--- a/tests/checkout/nasty.c
+++ b/tests/checkout/nasty.c
@@ -206,9 +206,8 @@ void test_checkout_nasty__dot_git_dot(void)
*/
void test_checkout_nasty__git_tilde1(void)
{
-#ifdef GIT_WIN32
test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/git_tilde1", ".git/foobar");
-#endif
+ test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/git_tilde1", "git~1/foobar");
}
/* A tree that contains an entry "git~2", when we have forced the short
@@ -274,6 +273,16 @@ void test_checkout_nasty__dot_git_colon_stuff(void)
#endif
}
+/* A tree that contains an entry ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION" because NTFS
+ * will interpret that as a synonym to ".git", even when mounted via SMB
+ * on macOS.
+ */
+void test_checkout_nasty__dotgit_alternate_data_stream(void)
+{
+ test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/dotgit_alternate_data_stream", ".git/dummy-file");
+ test_checkout_fails("refs/heads/dotgit_alternate_data_stream", ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/dummy-file");
+}
+
/* Trees that contains entries with a tree ".git" that contain
* byte sequences:
* { 0xe2, 0x80, 0x8c }
diff --git a/tests/clar_libgit2.h b/tests/clar_libgit2.h
index 63cd266..12175c6 100644
--- a/tests/clar_libgit2.h
+++ b/tests/clar_libgit2.h
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
* calls that are supposed to fail!
*/
#define cl_git_fail(expr) do { \
- git_error_clear(); \
if ((expr) == 0) \
+ git_error_clear(), \
cl_git_report_failure(0, 0, __FILE__, __LINE__, "Function call succeeded: " #expr); \
} while (0)
diff --git a/tests/index/tests.c b/tests/index/tests.c
index 1164cba..4c9deaa 100644
--- a/tests/index/tests.c
+++ b/tests/index/tests.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ void test_index_tests__add_bypath_to_a_bare_repository_returns_EBAREPO(void)
git_repository_free(bare_repo);
}
-static void add_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn)
+static void assert_add_bypath_fails(git_repository *repo, const char *fn)
{
git_index *index;
git_buf path = GIT_BUF_INIT;
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static void add_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn)
}
/* Test that writing an invalid filename fails */
-void test_index_tests__add_invalid_filename(void)
+void test_index_tests__cannot_add_invalid_filename(void)
{
git_repository *repo;
@@ -577,13 +577,69 @@ void test_index_tests__add_invalid_filename(void)
if (!git_path_exists("./invalid/.GiT"))
cl_must_pass(p_mkdir("./invalid/.GiT", 0777));
- add_invalid_filename(repo, ".git/hello");
- add_invalid_filename(repo, ".GIT/hello");
- add_invalid_filename(repo, ".GiT/hello");
- add_invalid_filename(repo, "./.git/hello");
- add_invalid_filename(repo, "./foo");
- add_invalid_filename(repo, "./bar");
- add_invalid_filename(repo, "subdir/../bar");
+ assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, ".git/hello");
+ assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, ".GIT/hello");
+ assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, ".GiT/hello");
+ assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, "./.git/hello");
+ assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, "./foo");
+ assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, "./bar");
+ assert_add_bypath_fails(repo, "subdir/../bar");
+
+ git_repository_free(repo);
+
+ cl_fixture_cleanup("invalid");
+}
+
+static void assert_add_fails(git_repository *repo, const char *fn)
+{
+ git_index *index;
+ git_buf path = GIT_BUF_INIT;
+ git_index_entry entry = {{0}};
+
+ cl_git_pass(git_repository_index(&index, repo));
+ cl_assert(git_index_entrycount(index) == 0);
+
+ entry.path = fn;
+ entry.mode = GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB;
+ cl_git_pass(git_oid_fromstr(&entry.id, "e69de29bb2d1d6434b8b29ae775ad8c2e48c5391"));
+
+ cl_git_fail(git_index_add(index, &entry));
+
+ cl_assert(git_index_entrycount(index) == 0);
+
+ git_buf_dispose(&path);
+ git_index_free(index);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test that writing an invalid filename fails on filesystem
+ * specific protected names
+ */
+void test_index_tests__cannot_add_protected_invalid_filename(void)
+{
+ git_repository *repo;
+ git_index *index;
+
+ cl_must_pass(p_mkdir("invalid", 0700));
+
+ cl_git_pass(git_repository_init(&repo, "./invalid", 0));
+
+ /* add a file to the repository so we can reference it later */
+ cl_git_pass(git_repository_index(&index, repo));
+ cl_git_mkfile("invalid/dummy.txt", "");
+ cl_git_pass(git_index_add_bypath(index, "dummy.txt"));
+ cl_must_pass(p_unlink("invalid/dummy.txt"));
+ cl_git_pass(git_index_remove_bypath(index, "dummy.txt"));
+ git_index_free(index);
+
+ cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectHFS", true);
+ cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectNTFS", true);
+
+ assert_add_fails(repo, ".git./hello");
+ assert_add_fails(repo, ".git\xe2\x80\xad/hello");
+ assert_add_fails(repo, "git~1/hello");
+ assert_add_fails(repo, ".git\xe2\x81\xaf/hello");
+ assert_add_fails(repo, ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/dummy-file");
git_repository_free(repo);
@@ -599,7 +655,7 @@ static void replace_char(char *str, char in, char out)
*c = out;
}
-static void write_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn_orig)
+static void assert_write_fails(git_repository *repo, const char *fn_orig)
{
git_index *index;
git_oid expected;
@@ -616,6 +672,7 @@ static void write_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn_orig)
*/
fn = git__strdup(fn_orig);
replace_char(fn, '/', '_');
+ replace_char(fn, ':', '!');
git_buf_joinpath(&path, "./invalid", fn);
@@ -627,6 +684,7 @@ static void write_invalid_filename(git_repository *repo, const char *fn_orig)
/* kids, don't try this at home */
replace_char((char *)entry->path, '_', '/');
+ replace_char((char *)entry->path, '!', ':');
/* write-tree */
cl_git_fail(git_index_write_tree(&expected, index));
@@ -672,13 +730,13 @@ void test_index_tests__write_invalid_filename(void)
cl_git_pass(git_repository_init(&repo, "./invalid", 0));
- write_invalid_filename(repo, ".git/hello");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, ".GIT/hello");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, ".GiT/hello");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, "./.git/hello");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, "./foo");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, "./bar");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, "foo/../bar");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, ".git/hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, ".GIT/hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, ".GiT/hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, "./.git/hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, "./foo");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, "./bar");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, "foo/../bar");
git_repository_free(repo);
@@ -696,16 +754,52 @@ void test_index_tests__honors_protect_filesystems(void)
cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectHFS", true);
cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectNTFS", true);
- write_invalid_filename(repo, ".git./hello");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, ".git\xe2\x80\xad/hello");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, "git~1/hello");
- write_invalid_filename(repo, ".git\xe2\x81\xaf/hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, ".git./hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, ".git\xe2\x80\xad/hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, "git~1/hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, ".git\xe2\x81\xaf/hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/dummy-file");
+
+ git_repository_free(repo);
+
+ cl_fixture_cleanup("invalid");
+}
+
+void test_index_tests__protectntfs_on_by_default(void)
+{
+ git_repository *repo;
+
+ p_mkdir("invalid", 0700);
+
+ cl_git_pass(git_repository_init(&repo, "./invalid", 0));
+ assert_write_fails(repo, ".git./hello");
+ assert_write_fails(repo, "git~1/hello");
git_repository_free(repo);
cl_fixture_cleanup("invalid");
}
+void test_index_tests__can_disable_protectntfs(void)
+{
+ git_repository *repo;
+ git_index *index;
+
+ cl_must_pass(p_mkdir("valid", 0700));
+ cl_git_rewritefile("valid/git~1", "steal the shortname");
+
+ cl_git_pass(git_repository_init(&repo, "./valid", 0));
+ cl_git_pass(git_repository_index(&index, repo));
+ cl_repo_set_bool(repo, "core.protectNTFS", false);
+
+ cl_git_pass(git_index_add_bypath(index, "git~1"));
+
+ git_index_free(index);
+ git_repository_free(repo);
+
+ cl_fixture_cleanup("valid");
+}
+
void test_index_tests__remove_entry(void)
{
git_repository *repo;
diff --git a/tests/object/tree/write.c b/tests/object/tree/write.c
index 9efeeb9..7b0b8ca 100644
--- a/tests/object/tree/write.c
+++ b/tests/object/tree/write.c
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ void test_object_tree_write__sorted_subtrees(void)
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_new(&builder, g_repo, NULL));
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(entries); ++i) {
- git_oid *id = entries[i].attr == GIT_FILEMODE_TREE ? &tid : &bid;
+ git_oid *id = entries[i].attr == GIT_FILEMODE_TREE ? &tid : &bid;
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL,
builder, entries[i].filename, id, entries[i].attr));
@@ -418,10 +418,8 @@ void test_object_tree_write__protect_filesystems(void)
*/
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_new(&builder, g_repo, NULL));
-#ifndef GIT_WIN32
- cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git.", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
- cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, "git~1", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
-#endif
+ cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git.", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
+ cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, "git~1", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
#ifndef __APPLE__
cl_git_pass(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git\xef\xbb\xbf", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
@@ -444,6 +442,7 @@ void test_object_tree_write__protect_filesystems(void)
cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git\xef\xbb\xbf", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git\xe2\x80\xad", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
+ cl_git_fail(git_treebuilder_insert(NULL, builder, ".git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/dummy-file", &bid, GIT_FILEMODE_BLOB));
git_treebuilder_free(builder);
}
diff --git a/tests/path/core.c b/tests/path/core.c
index 3a68a93..48b518c 100644
--- a/tests/path/core.c
+++ b/tests/path/core.c
@@ -362,3 +362,14 @@ void test_path_core__join_unrooted(void)
git_buf_dispose(&out);
}
+
+void test_path_core__join_unrooted_respects_funny_windows_roots(void)
+{
+ test_join_unrooted("๐ฉ:/foo/bar/foobar", 9, "bar/foobar", "๐ฉ:/foo");
+ test_join_unrooted("๐ฉ:/foo/bar/foobar", 13, "foobar", "๐ฉ:/foo/bar");
+ test_join_unrooted("๐ฉ:/foo", 5, "๐ฉ:/foo", "๐ฉ:/asdf");
+ test_join_unrooted("๐ฉ:/foo/bar", 5, "๐ฉ:/foo/bar", "๐ฉ:/asdf");
+ test_join_unrooted("๐ฉ:/foo/bar/foobar", 9, "๐ฉ:/foo/bar/foobar", "๐ฉ:/foo");
+ test_join_unrooted("๐ฉ:/foo/bar/foobar", 13, "๐ฉ:/foo/bar/foobar", "๐ฉ:/foo/bar");
+ test_join_unrooted("๐ฉ:/foo/bar/foobar", 9, "๐ฉ:/foo/bar/foobar", "๐ฉ:/foo/");
+}
diff --git a/tests/path/dotgit.c b/tests/path/dotgit.c
index 3099669..ceb7330 100644
--- a/tests/path/dotgit.c
+++ b/tests/path/dotgit.c
@@ -116,4 +116,5 @@ void test_path_dotgit__dotgit_modules_symlink(void)
cl_assert_equal_b(true, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", 0, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_HFS|GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_HFS));
cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
+ cl_assert_equal_b(false, git_path_isvalid(NULL, ".gitmodules . .::$DATA", S_IFLNK, GIT_PATH_REJECT_DOT_GIT_NTFS));
}
diff --git a/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/objects/33/8190107c7ee7d8f5aa30061fc19b7d5ddcda86 b/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/objects/33/8190107c7ee7d8f5aa30061fc19b7d5ddcda86
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index 0000000..e539ccf
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diff --git a/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/objects/97/c14994866466aeb73e769a6f34e07c7f4b53f7 b/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/objects/97/c14994866466aeb73e769a6f34e07c7f4b53f7
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f76799
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diff --git a/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/objects/b8/edf3ad62dbcbc983857a5bfee7b0181ee1a513 b/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/objects/b8/edf3ad62dbcbc983857a5bfee7b0181ee1a513
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index 0000000..bf44626
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diff --git a/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/refs/heads/dotgit_alternate_data_stream b/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/refs/heads/dotgit_alternate_data_stream
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ecdd340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/refs/heads/dotgit_alternate_data_stream
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+b8edf3ad62dbcbc983857a5bfee7b0181ee1a513