tests/resources/nasty/.gitted/objects/b8


Log

Author Commit Date CI Message
Johannes Schindelin 3f7851ea 2019-09-18T14:32:05 Disallow NTFS Alternate Data Stream attacks, even on Linux/macOS A little-known feature of NTFS is that it offers to store metadata in so-called "Alternate Data Streams" (inspired by Apple's "resource forks") that are copied together with the file they are associated with. These Alternate Data Streams can be accessed via `<file name>:<stream name>:<stream type>`. Directories, too, have Alternate Data Streams, and they even have a default stream type `$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. Which means that `abc/` and `abc::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/` are actually equivalent. This is of course another attack vector on the Git directory that we definitely want to prevent. On Windows, we already do this incidentally, by disallowing colons in file/directory names. While it looks as if files'/directories' Alternate Data Streams are not accessible in the Windows Subsystem for Linux, and neither via CIFS/SMB-mounted network shares in Linux, it _is_ possible to access them on SMB-mounted network shares on macOS. Therefore, let's go the extra mile and prevent this particular attack _everywhere_. To keep things simple, let's just disallow *any* Alternate Data Stream of `.git`. This is libgit2's variant of CVE-2019-1352. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Edward Thomson a64119e3 2014-11-25T18:13:00 checkout: disallow bad paths on win32 Disallow: 1. paths with trailing dot 2. paths with trailing space 3. paths with trailing colon 4. paths that are 8.3 short names of .git folders ("GIT~1") 5. paths that are reserved path names (COM1, LPT1, etc). 6. paths with reserved DOS characters (colons, asterisks, etc) These paths would (without \\?\ syntax) be elided to other paths - for example, ".git." would be written as ".git". As a result, writing these paths literally (using \\?\ syntax) makes them hard to operate with from the shell, Windows Explorer or other tools. Disallow these.