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3f7851ea
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2019-09-18T14:32:05
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Disallow NTFS Alternate Data Stream attacks, even on Linux/macOS
A little-known feature of NTFS is that it offers to store metadata in
so-called "Alternate Data Streams" (inspired by Apple's "resource
forks") that are copied together with the file they are associated with.
These Alternate Data Streams can be accessed via `<file name>:<stream
name>:<stream type>`.
Directories, too, have Alternate Data Streams, and they even have a
default stream type `$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. Which means that `abc/` and
`abc::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/` are actually equivalent.
This is of course another attack vector on the Git directory that we
definitely want to prevent.
On Windows, we already do this incidentally, by disallowing colons in
file/directory names.
While it looks as if files'/directories' Alternate Data Streams are not
accessible in the Windows Subsystem for Linux, and neither via
CIFS/SMB-mounted network shares in Linux, it _is_ possible to access
them on SMB-mounted network shares on macOS.
Therefore, let's go the extra mile and prevent this particular attack
_everywhere_. To keep things simple, let's just disallow *any* Alternate
Data Stream of `.git`.
This is libgit2's variant of CVE-2019-1352.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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a64119e3
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2014-11-25T18:13:00
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checkout: disallow bad paths on win32
Disallow:
1. paths with trailing dot
2. paths with trailing space
3. paths with trailing colon
4. paths that are 8.3 short names of .git folders ("GIT~1")
5. paths that are reserved path names (COM1, LPT1, etc).
6. paths with reserved DOS characters (colons, asterisks, etc)
These paths would (without \\?\ syntax) be elided to other paths - for
example, ".git." would be written as ".git". As a result, writing these
paths literally (using \\?\ syntax) makes them hard to operate with from
the shell, Windows Explorer or other tools. Disallow these.
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