Author :
jsing
Date :
2025-03-12 14:03:55
Hash :7eb10788 Message :Provide SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION and SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION.
In January 2017 we added SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION, which results in a
SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION fatal alert if a ClientHello message is seen on an
active connection (client initiated renegotation). Then in May 2017 OpenSSL
added SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION, which results in a SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
warning alert if a server receives a ClientHello on an active connection
(client initiated renegotation), or a client receives a HelloRequest
(server requested renegotation). This option also causes calls to
SSL_renegotiate() and SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to fail. Then in 2021,
OpenSSL also added SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION, which trumps
SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION but only for incoming ClientHello messages
(apparently unsetting SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is too hard).
Provide SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION and SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION,
primarily to make life easier for ports. If SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION
is set it will take precedence and render SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION
ineffective. The rest of the behaviour should match OpenSSL, with the
exception of ClientHellos triggering fatal alerts instead of warnings.
ok tb@
jsing