Edit
IABSD.fr/src/lib/libssl/ssl_clnt.c
Branch :
-
Show log
Commit
-
Author :
jsing
Date : 2026-04-03 12:58:19
Hash : 8da299b8
Message : Ensure that we cannot negotiate TLSv1.1 or lower. TLS versions prior to TLSv1.2 were disabled a while ago, however this was done in the version handling code. Remove TLSv1.1 and earlier from ssl_get_method() and add an explicit min version check in the legacy client and server, to provide a stronger guarantee. ok kenjiro@ tb@
- lib/libssl/ssl_clnt.c
-
/* $OpenBSD: ssl_clnt.c,v 1.171 2026/04/03 12:58:19 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include <limits.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/curve25519.h> #include <openssl/dh.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/md5.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> #include "bytestring.h" #include "dtls_local.h" #include "ssl_local.h" #include "ssl_sigalgs.h" #include "ssl_tlsext.h" static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b); static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_dtls_hello_verify(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s); static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s); static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s); static int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey); static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s); static int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s); static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); static int ssl3_send_client_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s); static int ssl3_send_client_finished(SSL *s); static int ssl3_get_server_finished(SSL *s); int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { int new_state, state, skip = 0; int ret = -1; ERR_clear_error(); errno = 0; s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); for (;;) { state = s->s3->hs.state; switch (s->s3->hs.state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->renegotiate = 1; s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; /* break */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: s->server = 0; ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); if (!ssl_legacy_stack_version(s, s->version)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl_supported_tls_version_range(s, &s->s3->hs.our_min_tls_version, &s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); ret = -1; goto end; } /* Ensure that we cannot negotiate TLSv1.1 or lower. */ if (s->s3->hs.our_min_tls_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl_security_version(s, s->s3->hs.our_min_tls_version)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { ret = -1; goto end; } /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; s->init_num = 0; if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); s->d1->send_cookie = 0; s->hit = 0; } break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ tls1_transcript_reset(s); dtls1_start_timer(s); } ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_is_dtls(s) && s->d1->send_cookie) { s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; } else s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num = 0; /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ if (s->bbio != s->wbio) s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) { s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; if (!SSL_is_dtls(s)) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { /* receive renewed session ticket */ s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; } /* No client certificate verification. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); } } else if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { s->s3->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; } else { s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; } s->init_num = 0; break; case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: ret = ssl3_get_dtls_hello_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */ s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; else s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: ret = ssl3_check_finished(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { s->hit = 1; if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; break; } /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH. */ if (!(s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num = 0; /* * At this point we check that we have the * required stuff from the server. */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request) s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; else s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; /* * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert * sent back */ /* * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. * We need to skip the certificate verify * message when client's ECDH public key is sent * inside the client certificate. */ if (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request == 1) { s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; } else { s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; } s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num = 0; s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: if (SSL_is_dtls(s) && !s->hit) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_change_cipher_spec(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; s->session->cipher_value = s->s3->hs.cipher->value; if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!tls1_change_write_cipher_state(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: if (SSL_is_dtls(s) && !s->hit) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_finished(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (!SSL_is_dtls(s)) s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; /* clear flags */ if (s->hit) { s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; } else { /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; else s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret = ssl3_get_server_finished(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->hit) s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; else s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */ if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->hs.state = s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state; } } ret = -1; goto end; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->hs.state = s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->s3->handshake_transcript != NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } if (!SSL_is_dtls(s)) ssl3_release_init_buffer(s); ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num = 0; s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; ret = 1; /* s->server=0; */ s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; } goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; goto end; /* break; */ } /* did we do anything */ if (!s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->s3->hs.state != state) { new_state = s->s3->hs.state; s->s3->hs.state = state; ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); s->s3->hs.state = new_state; } } skip = 0; } end: s->in_handshake--; ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s) { CBB cbb, client_hello, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; CBB compression_methods; uint16_t max_version; size_t sl; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; if (!ssl_max_supported_version(s, &max_version)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); return (-1); } s->version = max_version; if (sess == NULL || sess->ssl_version != s->version || (sess->session_id_length == 0 && sess->tlsext_tick == NULL) || sess->not_resumable) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) goto err; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ /* * If a DTLS ClientHello message is being resent after a * HelloVerifyRequest, we must retain the original client * random value. */ if (!SSL_is_dtls(s) || s->d1->send_cookie == 0) arc4random_buf(s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u16(&client_hello, s->version)) goto err; /* Random stuff */ if (!CBB_add_bytes(&client_hello, s->s3->client_random, sizeof(s->s3->client_random))) goto err; /* Session ID */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) goto err; if (!s->new_session && s->session->session_id_length > 0) { sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) goto err; } /* DTLS Cookie. */ if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) goto err; } /* Ciphers supported */ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites)) return 0; if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &cipher_suites)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } /* Add in compression methods (null) */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u8(&compression_methods, 0)) goto err; /* TLS extensions */ if (!tlsext_client_build(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH, &client_hello)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_dtls_hello_verify(SSL *s) { CBS hello_verify_request, cookie; size_t cookie_len; uint16_t ssl_version; int al, ret; if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A, DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0) return ret; if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { s->d1->send_cookie = 0; s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (s->init_num < 0) goto decode_err; CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, s->init_msg, s->init_num); if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &ssl_version)) goto decode_err; if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie)) goto decode_err; if (CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) goto decode_err; /* * Per RFC 6347 section 4.2.1, the HelloVerifyRequest should always * contain DTLSv1.0 the version that is going to be negotiated. * Tolerate DTLSv1.2 just in case. */ if (ssl_version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl_version != DTLS1_2_VERSION) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (ssl_version & 0xff); al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto fatal_err; } if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, sizeof(s->d1->cookie), &cookie_len)) { s->d1->cookie_len = 0; al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto fatal_err; } s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; s->d1->send_cookie = 1; return 1; decode_err: al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; fatal_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return -1; } static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { CBS cbs, server_random, session_id; uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; uint8_t compression_method; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; const SSL_METHOD *method; int al, ret; s->first_packet = 1; if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000 /* ?? */)) <= 0) return ret; s->first_packet = 0; if (s->init_num < 0) goto decode_err; CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) { s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } else { /* Already sent a cookie. */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto fatal_err; } } } if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto fatal_err; } if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &server_version)) goto decode_err; if (!ssl_check_version_from_server(s, server_version)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (server_version & 0xff); al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto fatal_err; } s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version = server_version; s->version = server_version; s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version = ssl_tls_version(server_version); if (s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version == 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((method = ssl_get_method(server_version)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->method = method; /* Server random. */ if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto decode_err; if (!CBS_write_bytes(&server_random, s->s3->server_random, sizeof(s->s3->server_random), NULL)) goto err; if (s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION && s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version < s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version) { /* * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. We must not downgrade if the server * random value contains the TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.1 magical value. */ if (!CBS_skip(&server_random, CBS_len(&server_random) - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12))) goto err; if (s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version == TLS1_2_VERSION && CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_12, sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12))) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto fatal_err; } if (CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_11, sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11))) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto fatal_err; } } /* Session ID. */ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) goto decode_err; if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto fatal_err; } /* Cipher suite. */ if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &cipher_suite)) goto decode_err; /* * Check if we want to resume the session based on external * pre-shared secret. */ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; int master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (!s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (master_key_length <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; /* * XXX - this appears to be completely broken. The * client cannot change the cipher at this stage, * as the server has already made a selection. */ if ((s->s3->hs.cipher = pref_cipher) == NULL) s->s3->hs.cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; } if (s->session->session_id_length != 0 && CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id, s->session->session_id_length)) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || timingsafe_memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length) != 0) { /* actually a client application bug */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto fatal_err; } s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->hit = 1; } else { /* a miss or crap from the other end */ /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ s->hit = 0; if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto fatal_err; } } /* * XXX - improve the handling for the case where there is a * zero length session identifier. */ if (!CBS_write_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sizeof(s->session->session_id), &s->session->session_id_length)) goto err; s->session->ssl_version = s->version; } if ((cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto fatal_err; } /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later. */ if ((cipher->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto fatal_err; } if (!ssl_cipher_in_list(SSL_get_ciphers(s), cipher)) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto fatal_err; } /* * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that * cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_value != cipher->value)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); goto fatal_err; } s->s3->hs.cipher = cipher; s->session->cipher_value = cipher->value; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s)) goto err; /* * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for * client authentication. */ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) tls1_transcript_free(s); if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &compression_method)) goto decode_err; if (compression_method != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto fatal_err; } if (!tlsext_client_parse(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH, &cbs, &al)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto fatal_err; } if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) goto decode_err; /* * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI * absence on initial connect only. */ if (!s->s3->renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); goto fatal_err; } if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } return (1); decode_err: /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); fatal_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) { CBS cbs, cert_list, cert_data; STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL; X509 *cert = NULL; const uint8_t *p; int al, ret; if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0) return ret; ret = -1; if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto fatal_err; } if ((certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (s->init_num < 0) goto decode_err; CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cert_list)) goto decode_err; if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) goto decode_err; while (CBS_len(&cert_list) > 0) { if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_list, &cert_data)) goto decode_err; p = CBS_data(&cert_data); if ((cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, CBS_len(&cert_data))) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto fatal_err; } if (p != CBS_data(&cert_data) + CBS_len(&cert_data)) goto decode_err; if (!sk_X509_push(certs, cert)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } cert = NULL; } /* A server must always provide a non-empty certificate list. */ if (sk_X509_num(certs) < 1) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); goto decode_err; } if (ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, certs) <= 0 && s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto fatal_err; } s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; ERR_clear_error(); if (!tls_process_peer_certs(s, certs)) goto err; ret = 1; if (0) { decode_err: /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); fatal_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); } err: sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); X509_free(cert); return (ret); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) { int decode_error, invalid_params, invalid_key; int nid = NID_dhKeyAgreement; tls_key_share_free(s->s3->hs.key_share); if ((s->s3->hs.key_share = tls_key_share_new_nid(nid)) == NULL) goto err; if (!tls_key_share_peer_params(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbs, &decode_error, &invalid_params)) { if (decode_error) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); } goto err; } if (!tls_key_share_client_peer_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbs, &decode_error, &invalid_key)) { if (decode_error) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); } goto err; } if (invalid_params) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if (invalid_key) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if (!tls_key_share_peer_security(s, s->s3->hs.key_share)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; err: return 0; } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) { uint8_t curve_type; uint16_t group_id; int decode_error; CBS public; if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type)) goto decode_err; if (!CBS_get_u16(cbs, &group_id)) goto decode_err; /* Only named curves are supported. */ if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public)) goto decode_err; /* * Check that the group is one of our preferences - if it is not, * the server has sent us an invalid group. */ if (!tls1_check_group(s, group_id)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); goto err; } tls_key_share_free(s->s3->hs.key_share); if ((s->s3->hs.key_share = tls_key_share_new(group_id)) == NULL) goto err; if (!tls_key_share_client_peer_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, &public, &decode_error, NULL)) { if (decode_error) goto decode_err; goto err; } return 1; decode_err: SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); err: return 0; } static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { CBB cbb; CBS cbs, params, signature; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; unsigned char *signed_params = NULL; size_t signed_params_len; size_t params_len; long alg_k, alg_a; int al, ret; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth; /* * Use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped. */ if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0) return ret; if ((md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (s->init_num < 0) goto err; CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { /* * Do not skip server key exchange if this cipher suite uses * ephemeral keys. */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto fatal_err; } s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return (1); } if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto err; CBS_dup(&cbs, ¶ms); if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { if (!ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbs)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { if (!ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbs)) goto err; } else if (alg_k != 0) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto fatal_err; } if ((params_len = CBS_offset(&cbs)) > CBS_len(¶ms)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, CBS_data(¶ms), params_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &signed_params, &signed_params_len)) goto err; /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) == 0) { uint16_t sigalg_value = SIGALG_NONE; const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) != 0 && s->session->peer_cert_type == SSL_PKEY_RSA) { pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer_cert); } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) != 0 && s->session->peer_cert_type == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer_cert); } if (pkey == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto fatal_err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value)) goto decode_err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature)) goto decode_err; if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto fatal_err; } if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_for_peer(s, pkey, sigalg_value)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto fatal_err; } s->s3->hs.peer_sigalg = sigalg; if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, sigalg->md(), NULL, pkey)) goto err; if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) goto err; if (EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), signed_params, signed_params_len) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto fatal_err; } } if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto fatal_err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); free(signed_params); return (1); decode_err: al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); fatal_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); free(signed_params); return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { CBS cert_request, cert_types, rdn_list; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; const unsigned char *q; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; int ret; if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0) return ret; ret = 0; s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 0; if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; /* * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records * as we wont be doing client auth. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); return (1); } if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto err; } /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if (s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); goto err; } if (s->init_num < 0) goto decode_err; CBS_init(&cert_request, s->init_msg, s->init_num); if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types)) goto decode_err; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { CBS sigalgs; if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (CBS_len(&sigalgs) % 2 != 0 || CBS_len(&sigalgs) > 64) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBS_stow(&sigalgs, &s->s3->hs.sigalgs, &s->s3->hs.sigalgs_len)) goto err; } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &rdn_list) || CBS_len(&cert_request) != 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (CBS_len(&rdn_list) > 0) { CBS rdn; if (CBS_len(&rdn_list) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&rdn_list, &rdn)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); goto err; } q = CBS_data(&rdn); if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&rdn))) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (q != CBS_data(&rdn) + CBS_len(&rdn)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } xn = NULL; /* avoid free in err block */ } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 1; sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->hs.tls12.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); s->s3->hs.tls12.ca_names = ca_sk; ca_sk = NULL; ret = 1; if (0) { decode_err: SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); } err: X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return (ret); } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); } static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { uint32_t lifetime_hint; CBS cbs, session_ticket; unsigned int session_id_length = 0; int al, ret; if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384)) <= 0) return ret; if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto fatal_err; } if (s->init_num < 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto fatal_err; } CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); if (!CBS_get_u32(&cbs, &lifetime_hint) || !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_ticket) || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto fatal_err; } s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = lifetime_hint; if (!CBS_stow(&session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal * client session ID matching to work and we know much * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. * * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine * session resumption. * * We choose the former approach because this fits in with * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set * to the SHA256 hash of the ticket. */ /* XXX - ensure this doesn't overflow session_id if hash is changed. */ if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&session_ticket), CBS_len(&session_ticket), s->session->session_id, &session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto fatal_err; } s->session->session_id_length = session_id_length; return (1); fatal_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) { CBS cert_status, response; uint8_t status_type; int al, ret; if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, -1, 16384)) <= 0) return ret; if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { /* * Tell the callback the server did not send us an OSCP * response, and has decided to head directly to key exchange. */ if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len = 0; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); goto fatal_err; } if (ret < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto fatal_err; } } s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE && s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto fatal_err; } if (s->init_num < 0) { /* need at least status type + length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto fatal_err; } CBS_init(&cert_status, s->init_msg, s->init_num); if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_status, &status_type) || CBS_len(&cert_status) < 3) { /* need at least status type + length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto fatal_err; } if (status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto fatal_err; } if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_status, &response) || CBS_len(&cert_status) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto fatal_err; } if (!CBS_stow(&response, &s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, &s->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto fatal_err; } if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); goto fatal_err; } if (ret < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto fatal_err; } } return (1); fatal_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { int ret; if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30 /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */)) <= 0) return ret; if (s->init_num != 0) { /* should contain no data */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return -1; } return 1; } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) { unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char *enc_pms = NULL; uint16_t max_legacy_version; EVP_PKEY *pkey; RSA *rsa; int ret = 0; int enc_len; CBB epms; /* * RSA-Encrypted Premaster Secret Message - RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. */ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer_cert); if (pkey == NULL || (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * Our maximum legacy protocol version - while RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1 * says "The latest (newest) version supported by the client", if we're * doing RSA key exchange then we have to presume that we're talking to * a server that does not understand the supported versions extension * and therefore our maximum version is that sent in the ClientHello. */ if (!ssl_max_legacy_version(s, &max_legacy_version)) goto err; pms[0] = max_legacy_version >> 8; pms[1] = max_legacy_version & 0xff; arc4random_buf(&pms[2], sizeof(pms) - 2); if ((enc_pms = malloc(RSA_size(rsa))) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } enc_len = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(pms), pms, enc_pms, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (enc_len <= 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &epms)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&epms, enc_pms, enc_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, pms, sizeof(pms))) goto err; ret = 1; err: explicit_bzero(pms, sizeof(pms)); free(enc_pms); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) { uint8_t *key = NULL; size_t key_len = 0; int ret = 0; /* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key from the server for DHE. */ if (s->s3->hs.key_share == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS); goto err; } if (!tls_key_share_client_generate(s->s3->hs.key_share)) goto err; if (!tls_key_share_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbb)) goto err; if (!tls_key_share_derive(s->s3->hs.key_share, &key, &key_len)) goto err; if (!tls_key_share_peer_security(s, s->s3->hs.key_share)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, key, key_len)) goto err; ret = 1; err: freezero(key, key_len); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb) { uint8_t *key = NULL; size_t key_len = 0; CBB public; int ret = 0; /* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for ECDHE. */ if (s->s3->hs.key_share == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!tls_key_share_client_generate(s->s3->hs.key_share)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &public)) return 0; if (!tls_key_share_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, &public)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; if (!tls_key_share_derive(s->s3->hs.key_share, &key, &key_len)) goto err; if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, key, key_len)) goto err; ret = 1; err: freezero(key, key_len); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_k; CBB cbb, kex; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey; if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &kex, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) goto err; if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if (!ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(s, &kex)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { if (!ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(s, &kex)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { if (!ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(s, &kex)) goto err; } else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; const unsigned char *hdata; unsigned char *signature = NULL; size_t signature_len, hdata_len; int ret = 0; if ((mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, sigalg->md(), NULL, pkey)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &signature_len, hdata, hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSign(mctx, signature, &signature_len, hdata, hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16(cert_verify, sigalg->value)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); free(signature); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; RSA *rsa; unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *signature = NULL; unsigned int signature_len; size_t data_len; int ret = 0; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), &data_len)) goto err; if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL) goto err; if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) goto err; if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, data_len, signature, &signature_len, rsa) <= 0 ) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: free(signature); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; EC_KEY *eckey; unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *signature = NULL; unsigned int signature_len; int ret = 0; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), NULL)) goto err; if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL) goto err; if ((eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) goto err; if (!ECDSA_sign(0, &data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, signature, &signature_len, eckey)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: free(signature); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) { const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg; CBB cbb, cert_verify; EVP_PKEY *pkey; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_verify, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) goto err; pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_select(s, pkey)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->hs.our_sigalg = sigalg; /* * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using * agreed digest and cached handshake records. */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(s, pkey, sigalg, &cert_verify)) goto err; } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(s, pkey, &cert_verify)) goto err; } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(s, pkey, &cert_verify)) goto err; } else { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tls1_transcript_free(s); if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; } return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; X509 *x509 = NULL; CBB cbb, client_cert; int i; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { if (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL || s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; else s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { /* * If we get an error, we need to * ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); * We then get retried later. */ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return (-1); } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) i = 0; } else if (i == 1) { i = 0; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i == 0) { s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 2; /* There is no client certificate to verify. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); } /* Ok, we have a cert */ s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_cert, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) goto err; if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &client_cert, (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) goto err; if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (0); } #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) static int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { long alg_k, alg_a; int nid = NID_undef; int i; alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth; /* We don't have a certificate. */ if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) return (1); if (s->s3->hs.key_share != NULL) nid = tls_key_share_nid(s->s3->hs.key_share); /* This is the passed certificate. */ if (s->session->peer_cert_type == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { if (!ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s, s->session->peer_cert)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto fatal_err; } return (1); } i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer_cert, NULL); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one. */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto fatal_err; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); goto fatal_err; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (nid == NID_dhKeyAgreement))) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); goto fatal_err; } return (1); fatal_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return (0); } /* * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. */ static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) { int ret; /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) return (1); /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate * message, so permit appropriate message length */ if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0) return ret; s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1; if ((s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) return (2); return (1); } static int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) return 0; return s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); } static int ssl3_send_client_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { size_t outlen; CBB cbb; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A) { if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->length)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, SSL3_MT_CCS)) goto err; if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &outlen)) goto err; if (outlen > INT_MAX) goto err; s->init_num = (int)outlen; s->init_off = 0; if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) { s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1); } s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ return ssl3_record_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return -1; } static int ssl3_send_client_finished(SSL *s) { CBB cbb, finished; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A) { if (!tls12_derive_finished(s)) goto err; /* Copy finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->hs.finished, s->s3->hs.finished_len); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = s->s3->hs.finished_len; if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &finished, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&finished, s->s3->hs.finished, s->s3->hs.finished_len)) goto err; if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B; } return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_server_finished(SSL *s) { int al, md_len, ret; CBS cbs; /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */ if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 64)) <= 0) return ret; /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); goto fatal_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; md_len = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; if (s->init_num < 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); goto fatal_err; } CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num); if (s->s3->hs.peer_finished_len != md_len || CBS_len(&cbs) != md_len) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); goto fatal_err; } if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cbs, s->s3->hs.peer_finished, CBS_len(&cbs))) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); goto fatal_err; } /* Copy finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */ OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->hs.peer_finished, md_len); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; return (1); fatal_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return (0); }