Edit
IABSD.fr/src/lib/libssl/ssl_clnt.c
Branch :
-
Show log
Commit
-
Author :
tb
Date : 2020-07-03 04:12:50
Hash : 9b8a142f
Message : Improve argument order for the internal tlsext API Move is_server and msg_type right after the SSL object so that CBS and CBB and alert come last. This brings these functions more in line with other internal functions and separates state from data. requested by jsing
- lib/libssl/ssl_clnt.c
-
/* $OpenBSD: ssl_clnt.c,v 1.70 2020/07/03 04:12:50 tb Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include <limits.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <stdio.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" #include <openssl/bn.h> #include <openssl/buffer.h> #include <openssl/curve25519.h> #include <openssl/dh.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/md5.h> #include <openssl/objects.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include <openssl/engine.h> #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST #include <openssl/gost.h> #endif #include "bytestring.h" #include "ssl_sigalgs.h" #include "ssl_tlsext.h" static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b); int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; int ret = -1; int new_state, state, skip = 0; ERR_clear_error(); errno = 0; if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->internal->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; s->internal->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); for (;;) { state = S3I(s)->hs.state; switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->internal->renegotiate = 1; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; /* break */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: s->server = 0; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } } else { if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } } /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ s->internal->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT; if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { ret = -1; goto end; } /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect++; s->internal->init_num = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); D1I(s)->send_cookie = 0; s->internal->hit = 0; } break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: s->internal->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ tls1_transcript_reset(s); dtls1_start_timer(s); } ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && D1I(s)->send_cookie) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; } else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ if (s->bbio != s->wbio) s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->internal->hit) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) { /* receive renewed session ticket */ S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; } /* No client certificate verification. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); } } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { S3I(s)->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; } else { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; } s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (D1I(s)->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */ S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: ret = ssl3_check_finished(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { s->internal->hit = 1; if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; } /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH. */ if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; /* * At this point we check that we have the * required stuff from the server. */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; /* * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert * sent back */ /* * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. * We need to skip the certificate verify * message when client's ECDH public key is sent * inside the client certificate. */ if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req == 1) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; } else { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0; } if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0; } } s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->internal->hit) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher; if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->internal->hit) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; /* clear flags */ if (s->internal->hit) { S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; } else { /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; else s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->internal->hit) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */ if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; } } ret = -1; goto end; } s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript != NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { BUF_MEM_free(s->internal->init_buf); s->internal->init_buf = NULL; } ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->internal->init_num = 0; s->internal->renegotiate = 0; s->internal->new_session = 0; ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->internal->hit) s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_hit++; ret = 1; /* s->server=0; */ s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_connect; s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect_good++; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 0; D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; } goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; goto end; /* break; */ } /* did we do anything */ if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->internal->debug) { if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) { new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state; S3I(s)->hs.state = state; cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state; } } skip = 0; } end: s->internal->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); return (ret); } int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s) { CBB cbb, client_hello, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; CBB compression_methods; uint16_t max_version; size_t sl; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; if (ssl_supported_version_range(s, NULL, &max_version) != 1) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); return (-1); } s->client_version = s->version = max_version; if (sess == NULL || sess->ssl_version != s->version || (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || sess->internal->not_resumable) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) goto err; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ /* * If a DTLS ClientHello message is being resent after a * HelloVerifyRequest, we must retain the original client * random value. */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || D1I(s)->send_cookie == 0) arc4random_buf(s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) goto err; /* * Version indicates the negotiated version: for example from * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can * choke if we initially report a higher version then * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports * 1.0. * * Possible scenario with previous logic: * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret * containing version 1.0. * * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. */ if (!CBB_add_u16(&client_hello, s->client_version)) goto err; /* Random stuff */ if (!CBB_add_bytes(&client_hello, s->s3->client_random, sizeof(s->s3->client_random))) goto err; /* Session ID */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) goto err; if (!s->internal->new_session && s->session->session_id_length > 0) { sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) goto err; } /* DTLS Cookie. */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (D1I(s)->cookie_len > sizeof(D1I(s)->cookie)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len)) goto err; } /* Ciphers supported */ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites)) return 0; if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &cipher_suites)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } /* Add in compression methods (null) */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u8(&compression_methods, 0)) goto err; /* TLS extensions */ if (!tlsext_client_build(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH, &client_hello)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { CBS cbs, server_random, session_id; uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; uint16_t min_version, max_version; uint8_t compression_method; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; const SSL_METHOD *method; unsigned long alg_k; size_t outlen; int i, al, ok; long n; s->internal->first_packet = 1; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, /* ?? */ &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); s->internal->first_packet = 0; if (n < 0) goto truncated; CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { if (D1I(s)->send_cookie == 0) { S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } else { /* Already sent a cookie. */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } } if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &server_version)) goto truncated; if (ssl_supported_version_range(s, &min_version, &max_version) != 1) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } if (server_version < min_version || server_version > max_version) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (server_version & 0xff); al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->version = server_version; if ((method = tls1_get_client_method(server_version)) == NULL) method = dtls1_get_client_method(server_version); if (method == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->method = method; /* Server random. */ if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto truncated; if (!CBS_write_bytes(&server_random, s->s3->server_random, sizeof(s->s3->server_random), NULL)) goto err; if (!ssl_downgrade_max_version(s, &max_version)) goto err; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION && s->version < max_version) { /* * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. We must not downgrade if the server * random value contains the TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.1 magical value. */ if (!CBS_skip(&server_random, CBS_len(&server_random) - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12))) goto err; if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_12, sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12))) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto f_err; } if (CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_11, sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11))) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto f_err; } } /* Session ID. */ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) goto truncated; if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* Cipher suite. */ if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &cipher_suite)) goto truncated; /* * Check if we want to resume the session based on external * pre-shared secret. */ if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; } } if (s->session->session_id_length != 0 && CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id, s->session->session_id_length)) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || timingsafe_memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length) != 0) { /* actually a client application bug */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto f_err; } s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->internal->hit = 1; } else { /* a miss or crap from the other end */ /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ s->internal->hit = 0; if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } /* * XXX - improve the handling for the case where there is a * zero length session identifier. */ if (!CBS_write_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sizeof(s->session->session_id), &outlen)) goto err; s->session->session_id_length = outlen; s->session->ssl_version = s->version; } if ((cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later. */ if ((cipher->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, cipher); if (i < 0) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that * cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->session->cipher) s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; if (s->internal->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != cipher->id)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = cipher; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s)) goto err; /* * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for * client authentication. */ alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST))) tls1_transcript_free(s); if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &compression_method)) goto truncated; if (compression_method != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } if (!tlsext_client_parse(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH, &cbs, &al)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } /* * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI * absence on initial connect only. */ if (!S3I(s)->renegotiate_seen && !(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); goto f_err; } if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } return (1); truncated: /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) { int al, i, ok, ret = -1; long n; CBS cbs, cert_list; X509 *x = NULL; const unsigned char *q; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; SESS_CERT *sc; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (n < 0) goto truncated; CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (CBS_len(&cbs) < 3) goto truncated; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cert_list) || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } while (CBS_len(&cert_list) > 0) { CBS cert; if (CBS_len(&cert_list) < 3) goto truncated; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_list, &cert)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q = CBS_data(&cert); x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert)); if (x == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto f_err; } if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; } i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ sc = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (sc == NULL) goto err; ssl_sess_cert_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert); SSI(s)->sess_cert = sc; sc->cert_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); sk = NULL; /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { x = NULL; al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); if (i < 0) { x = NULL; al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } sc->peer_cert_type = i; CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); /* * Why would the following ever happen? * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x; sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); X509_free(s->session->peer); CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); s->session->peer = x; s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; x = NULL; ret = 1; if (0) { truncated: /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); } err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return (ret); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY **pkey, CBS *cbs) { CBS dhp, dhg, dhpk; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; SESS_CERT *sc = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; long alg_a; int al; alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhp)) goto truncated; if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhp), CBS_len(&dhp), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhg)) goto truncated; if ((dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhg), CBS_len(&dhg), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhpk)) goto truncated; if ((dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhpk), CBS_len(&dhpk), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* * Check the strength of the DH key just constructed. * Discard keys weaker than 1024 bits. */ if (DH_size(dh) < 1024 / 8) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); goto err; } if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509); else /* XXX - Anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ *pkey = NULL; sc->peer_dh_tmp = dh; return (1); truncated: al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: DH_free(dh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, int nid, CBS *public) { EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; int ret = -1; /* Extract the server's ephemeral ECDH public key. */ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ssl_kex_peer_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, nid, public)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } sc->peer_nid = nid; sc->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; ecdh = NULL; ret = 1; err: EC_KEY_free(ecdh); return (ret); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, int nid, CBS *public) { size_t outlen; if (nid != NID_X25519) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (CBS_len(public) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBS_stow(public, &sc->peer_x25519_tmp, &outlen)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } return (1); err: return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY **pkey, CBS *cbs) { CBS public; uint8_t curve_type; uint16_t curve_id; SESS_CERT *sc; long alg_a; int nid; int al; alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert; /* Only named curves are supported. */ if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) || curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } /* * Check that the curve is one of our preferences - if it is not, * the server has sent us an invalid curve. */ if (tls1_check_curve(s, curve_id) != 1) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); goto f_err; } if ((nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id)) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public)) goto truncated; if (nid == NID_X25519) { if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, sc, nid, &public) != 1) goto err; } else { if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, sc, nid, &public) != 1) goto err; } /* * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA * and ECDSA. */ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509); else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); else /* XXX - Anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ *pkey = NULL; return (1); truncated: al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { CBS cbs, signature; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; const unsigned char *param; long n, alg_k, alg_a; int al, ok; size_t param_len; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* * Use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped. */ n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (n < 0) goto err; CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { /* * Do not skip server key exchange if this cipher suite uses * ephemeral keys. */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (1); } if (SSI(s)->sess_cert != NULL) { DH_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; EC_KEY_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_x25519_tmp); SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_x25519_tmp = NULL; } else { SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) goto err; } param = CBS_data(&cbs); param_len = CBS_len(&cbs); if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { if (ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(s, &pkey, &cbs) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &pkey, &cbs) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k != 0) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } param_len -= CBS_len(&cbs); /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { uint16_t sigalg_value; if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value)) goto truncated; if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg(sigalg_value, tls12_sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs_len)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if ((md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (!ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(sigalg, pkey, 0)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { sigalg = ssl_sigalg_lookup(SIGALG_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1); } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { sigalg = ssl_sigalg_lookup(SIGALG_ECDSA_SHA1); } else { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } md = sigalg->md(); if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature)) goto truncated; if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto err; if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len)) goto err; if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else { /* aNULL does not need public keys. */ if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (1); truncated: al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (-1); } int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { int ok, ret = 0; long n; uint8_t ctype_num; CBS cert_request, ctypes, rdn_list; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; const unsigned char *q; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 0; if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; /* * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records * as we wont be doing client auth. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); return (1); } if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto err; } /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); goto err; } if (n < 0) goto truncated; CBS_init(&cert_request, s->internal->init_msg, n); if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the certificate types */ if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_request, &ctype_num)) goto truncated; if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cert_request, &ctypes, ctype_num) || !CBS_write_bytes(&ctypes, (uint8_t *)S3I(s)->tmp.ctype, sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.ctype), NULL)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { CBS sigalgs; if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (CBS_len(&sigalgs) % 2 != 0 || CBS_len(&sigalgs) > 64) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBS_stow(&sigalgs, &S3I(s)->hs.sigalgs, &S3I(s)->hs.sigalgs_len)) goto err; } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &rdn_list) || CBS_len(&cert_request) != 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (CBS_len(&rdn_list) > 0) { CBS rdn; if (CBS_len(&rdn_list) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&rdn_list, &rdn)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); goto err; } q = CBS_data(&rdn); if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&rdn))) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (q != CBS_data(&rdn) + CBS_len(&rdn)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } xn = NULL; /* avoid free in err block */ } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 1; S3I(s)->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); S3I(s)->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; ca_sk = NULL; ret = 1; if (0) { truncated: SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); } err: X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return (ret); } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); } int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { int ok, al, ret = 0; uint32_t lifetime_hint; long n; CBS cbs, session_ticket; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (n < 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (!CBS_get_u32(&cbs, &lifetime_hint) || #if UINT32_MAX > LONG_MAX lifetime_hint > LONG_MAX || #endif !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_ticket) || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = (long)lifetime_hint; if (!CBS_stow(&session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal * client session ID matching to work and we know much * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. * * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine * session resumption. * * We choose the former approach because this fits in with * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the * ticket. */ EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&session_ticket), CBS_len(&session_ticket), s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL); ret = 1; return (ret); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) { CBS cert_status, response; int ok, al; long n; uint8_t status_type; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (n < 0) { /* need at least status type + length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } CBS_init(&cert_status, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_status, &status_type) || CBS_len(&cert_status) < 3) { /* need at least status type + length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_status, &response) || CBS_len(&cert_status) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!CBS_stow(&response, &s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, &s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_cb) { int ret; ret = s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); goto f_err; } if (ret < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return (-1); } int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { int ok, ret = 0; long n; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (n > 0) { /* should contain no data */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return (-1); } ret = 1; return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb) { unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char *enc_pms = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int ret = -1; int enc_len; CBB epms; /* * RSA-Encrypted Premaster Secret Message - RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. */ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509); if (pkey == NULL || pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; arc4random_buf(&pms[2], sizeof(pms) - 2); if ((enc_pms = malloc(RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa))) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } enc_len = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(pms), pms, enc_pms, pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (enc_len <= 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &epms)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&epms, enc_pms, enc_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pms, sizeof(pms)); ret = 1; err: explicit_bzero(pms, sizeof(pms)); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); free(enc_pms); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb) { DH *dh_srvr = NULL, *dh_clnt = NULL; unsigned char *key = NULL; int key_size = 0, key_len; unsigned char *data; int ret = -1; CBB dh_Yc; /* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for DHE. */ if (sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS); goto err; } dh_srvr = sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; /* Generate a new random key. */ if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if ((key_size = DH_size(dh_clnt)) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((key_len = DH_compute_key(key, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt)) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } /* Generate master key from the result. */ s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, key, key_len); if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Yc)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Yc, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key))) goto err; BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, data); if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; ret = 1; err: DH_free(dh_clnt); freezero(key, key_size); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb) { EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; uint8_t *key = NULL; size_t key_len = 0; int ret = -1; CBB ecpoint; if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ssl_kex_generate_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, sc->peer_nid)) goto err; /* Encode our public key. */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) goto err; if (!ssl_kex_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, &ecpoint)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; if (!ssl_kex_derive_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, sc->peer_ecdh_tmp, &key, &key_len)) goto err; s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, key, key_len); ret = 1; err: freezero(key, key_len); EC_KEY_free(ecdh); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb) { uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *private_key = NULL, *shared_key = NULL; int ret = -1; CBB ecpoint; /* Generate X25519 key pair and derive shared key. */ if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) goto err; if ((private_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) goto err; if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) goto err; X25519_keypair(public_key, private_key); if (!X25519(shared_key, private_key, sc->peer_x25519_tmp)) goto err; /* Serialize the public key. */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; /* Generate master key from the result. */ s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); ret = 1; err: free(public_key); freezero(private_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb) { if (sc->peer_x25519_tmp != NULL) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, sc, cbb) != 1) goto err; } else if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, sc, cbb) != 1) goto err; } else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return (1); err: return (-1); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb) { unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; EVP_PKEY *pub_key = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; X509 *peer_cert; size_t msglen; unsigned int md_len; EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; int ret = -1; int nid; CBB gostblob; /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ peer_cert = sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].x509; if (peer_cert == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); goto err; } pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert); pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key, NULL); /* * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key parameters match * those of server certificate, use certificate key for key exchange. * Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair. */ EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); /* Generate session key. */ arc4random_buf(premaster_secret, 32); /* * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key. */ if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) { /* * If there was an error - just ignore it. * Ephemeral key would be used. */ ERR_clear_error(); } } /* * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context data. */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ukm_hash == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; else nid = NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_256; if (!EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) goto err; EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } /* * Make GOST keytransport blob message, encapsulate it into sequence. */ msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32) < 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&gostblob, tmp, msglen)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used. */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) { /* Set flag "skip certificate verify". */ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); ret = 1; err: explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); return (ret); } int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { SESS_CERT *sess_cert; unsigned long alg_k; CBB cbb, kex; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if ((sess_cert = SSI(s)->sess_cert) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &kex, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) goto err; if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1) goto err; } else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify) { const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg; CBB cbb_signature; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; const EVP_MD *md; const unsigned char *hdata; unsigned char *signature = NULL; size_t signature_len, hdata_len; int ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_select(s, pkey)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } if ((md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); goto err; } if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (sigalg->key_type == EVP_PKEY_GOSTR01 && EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &signature_len) || signature_len == 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, signature, &signature_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16(cert_verify, sigalg->value)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); free(signature); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *signature = NULL; unsigned int signature_len; size_t data_len; int ret = 0; pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), &data_len)) goto err; if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL) goto err; if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, data_len, signature, &signature_len, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: free(signature); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *signature = NULL; unsigned int signature_len; int ret = 0; pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), NULL)) goto err; if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL) goto err; if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, signature, &signature_len, pkey->pkey.ec)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: free(signature); return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST static int ssl3_send_client_verify_gost(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md; const unsigned char *hdata; unsigned char *signature = NULL; size_t signature_len; size_t hdata_len; int nid; int ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &signature_len) || signature_len == 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, signature, &signature_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); free(signature); return ret; } #endif int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) { CBB cbb, cert_verify; EVP_PKEY *pkey; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_verify, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) goto err; pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; /* * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature * using agreed digest and cached handshake records. */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(s, &cert_verify)) goto err; } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(s, &cert_verify)) goto err; } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(s, &cert_verify)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST } else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_gost(s, &cert_verify)) goto err; #endif } else { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tls1_transcript_free(s); if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; } return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; X509 *x509 = NULL; CBB cbb, client_cert; int i; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { if (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL || s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { /* * If we get an error, we need to * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); * We then get retied later */ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->internal->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return (-1); } s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) i = 0; } else if (i == 1) { i = 0; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i == 0) { S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 2; /* There is no client certificate to verify. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); } /* Ok, we have a cert */ S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_cert, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) goto err; if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &client_cert, (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) goto err; if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (0); } #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { int i, idx; long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; SESS_CERT *sc; DH *dh; alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* We don't have a certificate. */ if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) return (1); sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert; if (sc == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } dh = SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; /* This is the passed certificate. */ idx = sc->peer_cert_type; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg( sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) { /* check failed */ SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto f_err; } else { return (1); } } pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one. */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); goto f_err; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); err: return (0); } /* * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. */ int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) return (1); /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate * message, so permit appropriate message length */ n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; if ((S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) return (2); return (1); } int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (s->ctx->internal->client_cert_engine) { i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert( s->ctx->internal->client_cert_engine, s, SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i != 0) return (i); } #endif if (s->ctx->internal->client_cert_cb) i = s->ctx->internal->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); return (i); }