|
3f7851ea
|
2019-09-18T14:32:05
|
|
Disallow NTFS Alternate Data Stream attacks, even on Linux/macOS
A little-known feature of NTFS is that it offers to store metadata in
so-called "Alternate Data Streams" (inspired by Apple's "resource
forks") that are copied together with the file they are associated with.
These Alternate Data Streams can be accessed via `<file name>:<stream
name>:<stream type>`.
Directories, too, have Alternate Data Streams, and they even have a
default stream type `$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. Which means that `abc/` and
`abc::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/` are actually equivalent.
This is of course another attack vector on the Git directory that we
definitely want to prevent.
On Windows, we already do this incidentally, by disallowing colons in
file/directory names.
While it looks as if files'/directories' Alternate Data Streams are not
accessible in the Windows Subsystem for Linux, and neither via
CIFS/SMB-mounted network shares in Linux, it _is_ possible to access
them on SMB-mounted network shares on macOS.
Therefore, let's go the extra mile and prevent this particular attack
_everywhere_. To keep things simple, let's just disallow *any* Alternate
Data Stream of `.git`.
This is libgit2's variant of CVE-2019-1352.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
|
|
|
64c612cc
|
2019-09-18T15:25:02
|
|
Protect against 8.3 "short name" attacks also on Linux/macOS
The Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) is getting increasingly popular,
in particular because it makes it _so_ easy to run Linux software on
Windows' files, via the auto-mounted Windows drives (`C:\` is mapped to
`/mnt/c/`, no need to set that up manually).
Unfortunately, files/directories on the Windows drives can be accessed
via their _short names_, if that feature is enabled (which it is on the
`C:` drive by default).
Which means that we have to safeguard even our Linux users against the
short name attacks.
Further, while the default options of CIFS/SMB-mounts seem to disallow
accessing files on network shares via their short names on Linux/macOS,
it _is_ possible to do so with the right options.
So let's just safe-guard against short name attacks _everywhere_.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
|
|
e54343a4
|
2019-06-29T09:17:32
|
|
fileops: rename to "futils.h" to match function signatures
Our file utils functions all have a "futils" prefix, e.g.
`git_futils_touch`. One would thus naturally guess that their
definitions and implementation would live in files "futils.h" and
"futils.c", respectively, but in fact they live in "fileops.h".
Rename the files to match expectations.
|
|
|
ecf4f33a
|
2018-02-08T11:14:48
|
|
Convert usage of `git_buf_free` to new `git_buf_dispose`
|
|
3fbfae26
|
2018-05-22T20:37:23
|
|
checkout: change symlinked .gitmodules file test to expect failure
When dealing with `core.proectNTFS` and `core.protectHFS` we do check
against `.gitmodules` but we still have a failing test as the non-filesystem
codepath does not check for it.
|
|
|
a145f2b6
|
2018-05-22T14:16:45
|
|
checkout: add a failing test for refusing a symlinked .gitmodules
We want to reject these as they cause compatibility issues and can lead to git
writing to files outside of the repository.
|
|
07c989e9
|
2015-02-03T20:01:24
|
|
win32: further cleanups for 8.3 disabling
|
|
|
5f28ec84
|
2015-02-03T12:16:11
|
|
win32: cleanup 8.3 disabled tests
|
|
9dcc4a36
|
2015-01-28T23:04:50
|
|
Fix test failures when 8.3 is disabled
|
|
232bc895
|
2015-01-14T13:15:34
|
|
checkout tests: nasty symlinks
Symbolic links that abuse case insensitivity to write into .git.
|
|
|
ec74b40c
|
2014-12-16T18:53:55
|
|
Introduce core.protectHFS and core.protectNTFS
Validate HFS ignored char ".git" paths when `core.protectHFS` is
specified. Validate NTFS invalid ".git" paths when `core.protectNTFS`
is specified.
|
|
|
11d67b75
|
2014-12-10T19:12:16
|
|
checkout: disallow bad paths on HFS
HFS filesystems ignore some characters like U+200C. When these
characters are included in a path, they will be ignored for the
purposes of comparison with other paths. Thus, if you have a ".git"
folder, a folder of ".git<U+200C>" will also match. Protect our
".git" folder by ensuring that ".git<U+200C>" and friends do not match it.
|
|
|
a64119e3
|
2014-11-25T18:13:00
|
|
checkout: disallow bad paths on win32
Disallow:
1. paths with trailing dot
2. paths with trailing space
3. paths with trailing colon
4. paths that are 8.3 short names of .git folders ("GIT~1")
5. paths that are reserved path names (COM1, LPT1, etc).
6. paths with reserved DOS characters (colons, asterisks, etc)
These paths would (without \\?\ syntax) be elided to other paths - for
example, ".git." would be written as ".git". As a result, writing these
paths literally (using \\?\ syntax) makes them hard to operate with from
the shell, Windows Explorer or other tools. Disallow these.
|