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  • Hash : 93a9044f
    Author : Patrick Steinhardt
    Date : 2020-01-31T08:49:34

    fetchhead: strip credentials from remote URL If fetching from an anonymous remote via its URL, then the URL gets written into the FETCH_HEAD reference. This is mainly done to give valuable context to some commands, like for example git-merge(1), which will put the URL into the generated MERGE_MSG. As a result, what gets written into FETCH_HEAD may become public in some cases. This is especially important considering that URLs may contain credentials, e.g. when cloning 'https://foo:bar@example.com/repo' we persist the complete URL into FETCH_HEAD and put it without any kind of sanitization into the MERGE_MSG. This is obviously bad, as your login data has now just leaked as soon as you do git-push(1). When writing the URL into FETCH_HEAD, upstream git does strip credentials first. Let's do the same by trying to parse the remote URL as a "real" URL, removing any credentials and then re-formatting the URL. In case this fails, e.g. when it's a file path or not a valid URL, we just fall back to using the URL as-is without any sanitization. Add tests to verify our behaviour.